Saturday, October 1, 2016

New policy eliminates Israeli Defense Force service for immigrants ages 22-26


New policy eliminates IDF service for immigrants ages 22-26


The Ministry called mandatory conscription a “significant barrier” which has prompted young men to postpone their aliyah.



lone soldiers make Aliyah on the August 17 Nefesh B'Nefesh Aliyah flight from New York.

The Immigrant Absorption Ministry announced on Monday the adoption of a policy exempting new immigrants between the ages of 22 and 26 from mandatory army service.

Ministry representative Itzik Ohana informed MKs of the decision in a meeting of the Immigration, Absorption and Diaspora Committee, during which several ministries laid out their proposals for measures to ease the immigration process.


Ministry spokesman Elad Sonn saidt, “The intention is that the Israeli army will not recruit immigrants who come to Israel between the ages of 22-26.

To date, they were recruited to a service of six months but [the army] realized that it was not effective and they canceled it.”

The ministry welcomed the move, he continued, calling mandatory conscription a “significant barrier,” which had prompted young men to postpone their aliya. Sonn added, “Every immigrant who wishes to volunteer to enlist in the IDF for a significant [term of] service, could to do so in coordination with the IDF.”

Former MK Dov Lipman said, “I am very supportive of this decision.” Lipman currently works with lone soldiers – servicemen, often immigrants, who do not have or are not in touch with family in Israel.

“The issue of army service was one of the number one obstacles for new immigrants in this age group. They have a need to enter the workforce quickly, and this short army service was an obstacle for this,” said Lipman.

“I do believe that army programs where these new immigrants can use their professional training in the IDF should be explored as an optional, voluntary service.

This would give these new immigrants the benefits which come from serving in the IDF and integrating into Israeli society, while continuing to advance their professional careers.

New policy eliminates Israeli Defense Force service for immigrants ages 22-26


New policy eliminates IDF service for immigrants ages 22-26


The Ministry called mandatory conscription a “significant barrier” which has prompted young men to postpone their aliyah.



lone soldiers make Aliyah on the August 17 Nefesh B'Nefesh Aliyah flight from New York.

The Immigrant Absorption Ministry announced on Monday the adoption of a policy exempting new immigrants between the ages of 22 and 26 from mandatory army service.

Ministry representative Itzik Ohana informed MKs of the decision in a meeting of the Immigration, Absorption and Diaspora Committee, during which several ministries laid out their proposals for measures to ease the immigration process.


Ministry spokesman Elad Sonn saidt, “The intention is that the Israeli army will not recruit immigrants who come to Israel between the ages of 22-26.

To date, they were recruited to a service of six months but [the army] realized that it was not effective and they canceled it.”

The ministry welcomed the move, he continued, calling mandatory conscription a “significant barrier,” which had prompted young men to postpone their aliya. Sonn added, “Every immigrant who wishes to volunteer to enlist in the IDF for a significant [term of] service, could to do so in coordination with the IDF.”

Former MK Dov Lipman said, “I am very supportive of this decision.” Lipman currently works with lone soldiers – servicemen, often immigrants, who do not have or are not in touch with family in Israel.

“The issue of army service was one of the number one obstacles for new immigrants in this age group. They have a need to enter the workforce quickly, and this short army service was an obstacle for this,” said Lipman.

“I do believe that army programs where these new immigrants can use their professional training in the IDF should be explored as an optional, voluntary service.

This would give these new immigrants the benefits which come from serving in the IDF and integrating into Israeli society, while continuing to advance their professional careers.

MOU Deal:What will Israel do with $38 billion from the US?


MOU Deal:What will Israel do with $38 billion from the US?

F-35 fighter jet. (photo credit:LOCKHEED MARTIN)

A massive sigh of relief was let out Wednesday night at the Kirya IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv. For years, the IDF has been strategizing and planning what it would do with the $38 billion the United States pledged it will provide Israel over the next decade. But until the deal was signed on Wednesday, there was always the possibility that the new aid package would be postponed until the next US president took office and then possibly even longer.

Now, the IDF can move ahead with its plans. Here is part of its shopping list:

F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter



In June, the Israel Air Force took receipt of its first F-35 fifth-generation stealth fighter jet, in a festive ceremony in Forth Worth, Texas. This is the future plane of the air force and is expected to serve as its strategic workhorse over the next 30-to-40 years.

While the planes are expected to begin arriving in Israel at the end of the year, Israel has so far only ordered 33 F-35s and is looking to up that number to at least 50.

In addition, the IAF is seriously looking – partially due to some encouragement from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – at the F-35B, a short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) version of the aircraft, meaning that it does not need a full runway to take off and land.

This is important, given the possibility that in a future war, Israel is expected to face missile onslaughts against its air force bases and runways but will still need combat aircraft to take off and land for bombing raids and other missions.

V-22 Osprey



Israel has shown interest in purchasing the Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft for several years now. Former defense minister Moshe Ya’alon and then IDF chief of staff Benny Gantz enjoyed test flights and were both supporters of the deal. Now that the aid package has been finalized, the IDF can dust off those plans.

What makes the V-22 unique is its ability to take off and land like a helicopter, but then lower its blades, align them with the aircraft and fly at speeds and altitudes like an airplane. Surrounded by a growing anti-aircraft threat in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and beyond, the IAF sees the V-22 as a means for getting special forces in and out of enemy territory as well as for searchand- rescue operations. Its ability to land vertically enables it to drop soldiers in an exact location or to pick up a downed fighter pilot, and its ability to fly fast means it can get to safety quicker than a helicopter.

The IAF is looking to purchase just half a dozen V-22s for now and the US has already agreed to accelerate delivery and possibly take aircraft off of the Marines assembly line, if an order is made.

Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) and bunker busters



In addition to purchasing large aircraft and other weaponry, the foreign military aid Israel receives from the US is also traditionally used to stock up on JDAMs, kits that turn bombs into “smart bombs.”

In May, 2015, Israel ordered $1.8 billion worth of precision guided munitions and bombs, including bunker busters, bombs that have the ability to penetrate underground fortifications, like Hamas and Hezbollah command centers.

Facing enemies like Hamas and Hezbollah which embed themselves within civilian populations, Israel is relying more-and-more on accurate weaponry like JDAMs to ensure that the IDF kills its intended targets without civilian casualties and collateral damage.

The JDAM, essentially a kit that is installed on freefall bombs, turns them into precision-guided weapons that can be launched from standoff positions. At a time when Israel’s adversaries are believed to have sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons, the ability to attack targets from a distance is more important than before.

Boeing KC-46 Pegasus

The IAF currently operates a small fleet of Boeing KC-707 Re’em refueling tankers, used to fuel fighter jets midflight on long-range missions. The problem is that these KC-707s are old, some over 40-yearsold, and they won’t last much longer.

The US Air Force selected the KC-46 tanker a number of years ago and is expected to begin receiving its first batch of 18 planes next summer.

Israel closely followed the USAF’s decision and voiced its intention to purchase the plane as well to replace its aging fleet.

The problem is that the plane is expensive, reaching estimates of around $180 million per aircraft. Nevertheless, the IAF will have to make a decision soon. While the Iran deal puts the possibility of an Israeli strike against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities on hold, the IDF needs to retain and cultivate the capability to conduct long-range missions. Refueling tankers are essential for to make that happen.

Chinook or Stallions




The IAF is also in need of new heavy-lift transport helicopters to replace its current and aging fleet of CH-53 Sea Stallions, known in Israel as the Yasour.

First integrated into IAF service in 1969 after being bought from the United States, the Yasour is used regularly by the IAF’s 669 Search and Rescue team, and is known for legendary missions, such as the 1973 airlift of over 600 soldiers to the peak of Mount Hermon, which they recaptured from the Syrians.

The helicopter is the IAF’s primary aircraft for transporting soldiers – it can carry 35 with all their equipment – and was used extensively during the Second Lebanon War in 2006.

In 2007, the IAF began a new upgrade program for the helicopter called “Yasour 2025,” under which it installed over 20 new electronic systems including, for the first time on helicopters, one for missile defense.

But in 2025, it will need new helicopters. The two options being discussed are the CH-47 Chinook and CH-53K King Stallion, which is still under development by Sikorsky, the same manufacturer as the Yasour.

Just A Rip Roaring Zionist : POSTSCRIPT: SHIMON PERES, 1923-2016 ( New Yorker )...

Just A Rip Roaring Zionist : POSTSCRIPT: SHIMON PERES, 1923-2016 ( New Yorker )...: POSTSCRIPT: SHIMON PERES, 1923-2016 by Bernard Avishai ,( Republished with permission of the Author and The New Yorker in which the article ...

POSTSCRIPT: SHIMON PERES, 1923-2016 ( New Yorker )


POSTSCRIPT: SHIMON PERES, 1923-2016 by Bernard Avishai ,( Republished with permission of the Author and The New Yorker in which the article first appeared)
Image result for shimon peres 2014
Despite serving in almost every important government post, including Prime Minister, Shimon Peres remained something of an outsider in Israeli politics.

Shimon Peres, the former Israeli President, died at ninety-three, a revered elder statesman, but his glory days were as part of a suspect young guard. In the early fifties, he was part of a cadre of defense officials whom David Ben-Gurion promoted in order to wrest control of the economy from veteran leaders of the Zionist Labor Federation and hand it to the fledgling state. Peres was at first hawkish, in favor of nuclear deterrence against Arab invasion and retaliation against Palestinian border attacks. He ended his career as a symbol of the peace process, after secretly initiating and championing the 1993 Oslo Accords, for which he and his co-signers, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat, won the Nobel Peace Prize. “If I’ve changed my policies, it’s because the situation has changed. I was a hawk, but when we could make peace I was a dove,” he told David Remnick, in 2002.

For his seventy years of public life, Peres was famous as a man who tempered his views to accommodate shifts in political power. He held almost every important government post—Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Foreign Minister, President—and served people he both idolized and reviled. After the Oslo negotiations stalled, and during the darkest days of the Second Intifada, Peres assumed his last significant position, as Ariel Sharon’s Foreign Minister, and stayed even after Sharon put Arafat under siege. Yossi Beilin, an Oslo negotiator and a protégé of Peres, was not impressed: of Sharon, he said, in 2002, “To do what he is doing now, he needs a rabbi to make it all kosher.” Beilin added, “In Shimon Peres, Ariel Sharon got the most kosher rabbi in the world.”

Yet it would be wrong to suppose that Peres lacked governing principles. What set him apart, and prepared him for a short but pivotal premiership from 1984 to 1986, was political-economic prescience. Early on, he was a builder of Israel’s military power, becoming an expert on increasingly sophisticated arms. He grew fascinated by advanced technologies and, more important, the kind of society that advances them. In many ways, Israel’s entrepreneurial burst in the nineties was facilitated by Peres’s economic reforms of the eighties. It is no diminution of his achievement to say that he was Israel’s first technocrat. “The Arabs have the numerical superiority; we have technological superiority,” he told a cluster of reporters in 1974, while he was the Minister of Communications. “Technology will always defeat numbers.”

Szymon Perski, who emigrated with his family to Israel from Poland, in 1934, at age eleven, was viewed, in the parochial pioneering society he joined, as both a potential recruit and something of an intruder. The view stuck, and he seemed to embrace it, making himself conspicuously useful to his elders in the socialist élite, but also nudging them toward vaguely bourgeois values. Peres spent his adolescence on a kibbutz and at the Ben Shemen youth village. He wrote lyric Hebrew poetry. The writer Yael Dayan, the daughter of the military leader and government minister Moshe Dayan, told me recently that Peres was “insecure as a young man, cultivated relations with writers, and probably hoped to become one.”

His first distinction came in 1944, when, as a youth leader, he rushed from student group to scouting group, trying to keep the labor movement’s youth wing loyal to David Ben-Gurion’s governing social-democratic party, while much of the kibbutz movement, drawn to Soviet Marxism, parted ways with it. “Shyness and nerve are two sides of the same coin,” Peres later told his biographer, Matti Golan. Peres and Moshe Dayan were chosen as youth delegates to the 1946 Zionist Congress, in Basel, as plans for the partition of Palestine took shape. The following year, Peres joined the Haganah, the Labor Zionist self-defense force. Ben-Gurion personally made him responsible for organizing manpower, and for clandestine missions to buy weapons. These tasks kept Peres off the battlefields of the War of Independence, which earned him, unfairly, a lesser moral prestige than celebrated war heroes like Dayan, Rabin, and Sharon, who became his rivals for leadership positions in the seventies.

In 1953, Ben-Gurion, who was serving as the Defense Minister as well as Prime Minister, appointed Peres his Director-General of Defense. Peres was barely thirty. Ben-Gurion extolled him and Dayan, the Chief of Staff, as examples ofmamlachtiyut, or “statism”: the drive to absorb the flood of immigrants into nationalist, not proletarian, institutions. Ben-Gurion, exhausted, exited the government that year, but when he returned, two years later, Peres was his right hand, plotting Israeli participation in what would become the Suez Crisis, in 1956, and acting as the liaison to the French government. The connections would prove essential to setting up Israel’s nuclear program and acquiring the advanced jets that were critical to Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War, in 1967. But they also reinforced Peres’s enchantment with scientific management. Peres, who was elected to the Knesset in 1959 and became Deputy Defense Minister, grew impatient with traditional Labor Zionist condescension regarding market competition. He had seen what companies like Dassault, the French aircraft manufacturer, could do. That same year, Bedek, a company that Peres had helped found and the forerunner to Israel Aerospace Industries, produced its first plane.

Beginning in 1955, Peres and Dayan were embroiled in what came to be known as the Lavon Affair, the fallout from a botched operation to discredit Egypt’s new President, Gamal Abdul Nasser. The controversy finally led, in 1963, to Ben-Gurion’s resignation. In 1965, Peres persuaded Ben-Gurion and Dayan to lead a new leftist, secular-nationalist party, Rafi, which would, in Peres’s words, bring together “famous and influential names from the worlds of art, literature, commerce, and science.” The Party went on to join a national-unity government just before the 1967 war, and a united Labor Alignment during the euphoria after it. But its challenge to the labor aristocracy continued to define Peres’s position. In the wake of the Yom Kippur War, in 1973, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Dayan, the Defense Minister since 1967, were forced to resign; the clique that had inherited the Labor Alignment, run by the Finance Minister, Pinchas Sapir, anointed Rabin as Meir’s successor. Peres, though still marked as having been part of the Rafi insurrection, unexpectedly announced his candidacy. He presented himself as the hard-liner, supporting the National Religious Party’s defense of the settlement project. Peres won forty per cent of the delegates’ votes, conceded, and was named Defense Minister. Rabin would later brand Peres an “indefatigable schemer.” When, in 1976, Rabin planned to remove by force a Jewish outpost in the hills of Samaria, in the northern West Bank, Peres intervened to let it stay.

Rabin resigned over a minor financial infraction just before the election of May, 1977. Peres, his replacement, debated Menachem Begin, of the Likud Party, on television, insisting that it was the labor pioneers who knew how to settle the land. Begin won, concluded the Camp David Accords with Egypt in 1979, and increased the number of settlers to about ten thousand by 1981. Begin won reëlection that year, by increasing subsidies for staples and slashing tariffs on imported consumer products, setting off a spending spree among his poorer and less educated base. By 1984, government deficits, worsened by the Lebanon War, had pushed inflation to more than four hundred per cent.

The election that year produced a tie for Peres, and he assumed the Prime Minister’s job for two years, in a rotation agreement with Yitzhak Shamir. This proved to be Peres’s finest hour, as he worked tirelessly with respected economists to prevent economic collapse and to enable future growth, privatizing or closing failing public companies and encouraging private investment. He introduced a new shekel, pegging it to the dollar, while imposing austerity and wage and price controls. He confidently oriented the economy toward technology exports, focussed on the defense technologies he had nurtured, reinvested in the universities, and advocated for tax holidays to encourage investment by foreign technology corporations such as Intel, Motorola, and I.B.M. By 1991, the chairman of Intel-Israel, Dov Frohman, told me that the country was primed to become a home to technology startups: “four for every direct foreign investor.”

In the fall of 1993, I met with Peres, who was the Foreign Minister in the new Rabin government at the time, in New York. I was working for a consulting firm founded by, among others, the Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter. When I entered the room, Peres had Porter’s “Competitive Advantage” in his hands. He started off subdued, businesslike, but his face brightened when I asked how the state might facilitate an export-driven economy. He told me what many would later come to believe, that the competitive advantage Israel’s military gave it was not in its technology but in the “human capital” that the Army experience created: the teamwork, the comfort with advanced machinery. He spoke of Israel as a hub of a “new Middle East,” the name of a book he published that same year, which argued that economic integration, based on scientific exchange, had made war obsolete.

At the same time, political vanity caused Peres to miss opportunities to build that new Middle East. In 1987, shortly before the first intifada roiled the Palestinian territories, Peres, who was serving as Foreign Minister under Shamir, secretly negotiated a deal with King Hussein’s representatives in London, which would have brought Jordan into the peace process and halted settlement building. Peres promised Hussein that, if Shamir rejected the deal, he would resign and mount an electoral campaign on the issue. Shamir did reject it, Peres did not resign, and Hussein renounced all interest in representing Palestinian claims.

Peres was the indispensable proponent of the Oslo Accords with the Palestine Liberation Organization. But Oslo never produced a final-status agreement, and Rabin and Peres were put on the defensive by terror attacks and settler violence. After Rabin’s assassination, in 1995, Peres became Prime Minister, and the polls showed that he would have won an overwhelming victory over Benjamin Netanyahu had he called an immediate election. But Peres seemed determined first to prove that he could be charged with the nation’s security. He put the election off until the spring, and secretly authorized a series of retaliatory operations against Hamas terrorists, which led to retaliatory bus bombings. During the early spring, he authorized an action against Hezbollah in the north, Operation Grapes of Wrath, which included an errant strike against a Lebanese town in which more than a hundred civilians were killed. When an election was held in May, he lost to Netanyahu by less than a per cent. By the time Ehud Barak regained power for Oslo’s advocates, in 1999, the climate had been soured by settlement growth and terror, and in 2000 a new intifada broke out.

Thereafter, Peres was something of a shadow figure in Israeli politics, taking back interim leadership of Labor in 2004, and eventually joining with Sharon and Ehud Olmert in forming yet a new party, Kadima, in 2005. After Sharon’s death, Olmert formed a government and organized a Knesset vote to elect Peres to the Presidency, a largely honorific role, but one the outsider seemed to thrive in, inviting “famous and influential names,” as he had once put it, to his official residence, encouraging ethnic integration, and promoting large entrepreneurial projects: the electric car, a canal joining the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea. He seemed to revel in the idea that he’d never again face an election.

One is hard-pressed to know what was happening in the shadows, or to assess what political courage he had left. The late Ron Pundak, former head of the Peres Center and one of Oslo’s negotiators, told me just before his death, in 2014, that Peres had him deposed for his anti-government peace activities after 2009, “convinced that Netanyahu was serious about making progress toward a two-state solution.” Later in 2014, as his term as President was ending, Peres told Channel Two that he had met with the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, in Jordan three years before, and that the two had worked out a comprehensive peace deal, including recognition of Israel as a “Jewish state.” Netanyahu, Peres claimed, had “stopped it.”

Why did Peres not resign and expose the matter? Why, too, did he draw close to powerful mentors, adapt to new parties, take only the most calculated risks, and shift with the winds of war and peace? “Shimon never seemed far from the center of things, but felt himself the outsider,” Yael Dayan told me. “Shimon was the immigrant who knew the language well, who thought himself a man of letters. But he spoke with an accent; he had a certain paranoia.” The outsider’s restlessness seemed critical here. “Shimon was endlessly curious about the sciences, taught himself what he didn’t know: in chemistry, hydrology, nanotechnology, economics,” Dayan added. “He saw the Israel he wanted: advanced, democratic, multicultural, at peace. He did what he could to set the stage for it.”

POSTSCRIPT: SHIMON PERES, 1923-2016 ( New Yorker )


POSTSCRIPT: SHIMON PERES, 1923-2016 by Bernard Avishai ,( Republished with permission of the Author and The New Yorker in which the article first appeared)
Image result for shimon peres 2014
Despite serving in almost every important government post, including Prime Minister, Shimon Peres remained something of an outsider in Israeli politics.

Shimon Peres, the former Israeli President, died at ninety-three, a revered elder statesman, but his glory days were as part of a suspect young guard. In the early fifties, he was part of a cadre of defense officials whom David Ben-Gurion promoted in order to wrest control of the economy from veteran leaders of the Zionist Labor Federation and hand it to the fledgling state. Peres was at first hawkish, in favor of nuclear deterrence against Arab invasion and retaliation against Palestinian border attacks. He ended his career as a symbol of the peace process, after secretly initiating and championing the 1993 Oslo Accords, for which he and his co-signers, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat, won the Nobel Peace Prize. “If I’ve changed my policies, it’s because the situation has changed. I was a hawk, but when we could make peace I was a dove,” he told David Remnick, in 2002.

For his seventy years of public life, Peres was famous as a man who tempered his views to accommodate shifts in political power. He held almost every important government post—Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Foreign Minister, President—and served people he both idolized and reviled. After the Oslo negotiations stalled, and during the darkest days of the Second Intifada, Peres assumed his last significant position, as Ariel Sharon’s Foreign Minister, and stayed even after Sharon put Arafat under siege. Yossi Beilin, an Oslo negotiator and a protégé of Peres, was not impressed: of Sharon, he said, in 2002, “To do what he is doing now, he needs a rabbi to make it all kosher.” Beilin added, “In Shimon Peres, Ariel Sharon got the most kosher rabbi in the world.”

Yet it would be wrong to suppose that Peres lacked governing principles. What set him apart, and prepared him for a short but pivotal premiership from 1984 to 1986, was political-economic prescience. Early on, he was a builder of Israel’s military power, becoming an expert on increasingly sophisticated arms. He grew fascinated by advanced technologies and, more important, the kind of society that advances them. In many ways, Israel’s entrepreneurial burst in the nineties was facilitated by Peres’s economic reforms of the eighties. It is no diminution of his achievement to say that he was Israel’s first technocrat. “The Arabs have the numerical superiority; we have technological superiority,” he told a cluster of reporters in 1974, while he was the Minister of Communications. “Technology will always defeat numbers.”

Szymon Perski, who emigrated with his family to Israel from Poland, in 1934, at age eleven, was viewed, in the parochial pioneering society he joined, as both a potential recruit and something of an intruder. The view stuck, and he seemed to embrace it, making himself conspicuously useful to his elders in the socialist élite, but also nudging them toward vaguely bourgeois values. Peres spent his adolescence on a kibbutz and at the Ben Shemen youth village. He wrote lyric Hebrew poetry. The writer Yael Dayan, the daughter of the military leader and government minister Moshe Dayan, told me recently that Peres was “insecure as a young man, cultivated relations with writers, and probably hoped to become one.”

His first distinction came in 1944, when, as a youth leader, he rushed from student group to scouting group, trying to keep the labor movement’s youth wing loyal to David Ben-Gurion’s governing social-democratic party, while much of the kibbutz movement, drawn to Soviet Marxism, parted ways with it. “Shyness and nerve are two sides of the same coin,” Peres later told his biographer, Matti Golan. Peres and Moshe Dayan were chosen as youth delegates to the 1946 Zionist Congress, in Basel, as plans for the partition of Palestine took shape. The following year, Peres joined the Haganah, the Labor Zionist self-defense force. Ben-Gurion personally made him responsible for organizing manpower, and for clandestine missions to buy weapons. These tasks kept Peres off the battlefields of the War of Independence, which earned him, unfairly, a lesser moral prestige than celebrated war heroes like Dayan, Rabin, and Sharon, who became his rivals for leadership positions in the seventies.

In 1953, Ben-Gurion, who was serving as the Defense Minister as well as Prime Minister, appointed Peres his Director-General of Defense. Peres was barely thirty. Ben-Gurion extolled him and Dayan, the Chief of Staff, as examples ofmamlachtiyut, or “statism”: the drive to absorb the flood of immigrants into nationalist, not proletarian, institutions. Ben-Gurion, exhausted, exited the government that year, but when he returned, two years later, Peres was his right hand, plotting Israeli participation in what would become the Suez Crisis, in 1956, and acting as the liaison to the French government. The connections would prove essential to setting up Israel’s nuclear program and acquiring the advanced jets that were critical to Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War, in 1967. But they also reinforced Peres’s enchantment with scientific management. Peres, who was elected to the Knesset in 1959 and became Deputy Defense Minister, grew impatient with traditional Labor Zionist condescension regarding market competition. He had seen what companies like Dassault, the French aircraft manufacturer, could do. That same year, Bedek, a company that Peres had helped found and the forerunner to Israel Aerospace Industries, produced its first plane.

Beginning in 1955, Peres and Dayan were embroiled in what came to be known as the Lavon Affair, the fallout from a botched operation to discredit Egypt’s new President, Gamal Abdul Nasser. The controversy finally led, in 1963, to Ben-Gurion’s resignation. In 1965, Peres persuaded Ben-Gurion and Dayan to lead a new leftist, secular-nationalist party, Rafi, which would, in Peres’s words, bring together “famous and influential names from the worlds of art, literature, commerce, and science.” The Party went on to join a national-unity government just before the 1967 war, and a united Labor Alignment during the euphoria after it. But its challenge to the labor aristocracy continued to define Peres’s position. In the wake of the Yom Kippur War, in 1973, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Dayan, the Defense Minister since 1967, were forced to resign; the clique that had inherited the Labor Alignment, run by the Finance Minister, Pinchas Sapir, anointed Rabin as Meir’s successor. Peres, though still marked as having been part of the Rafi insurrection, unexpectedly announced his candidacy. He presented himself as the hard-liner, supporting the National Religious Party’s defense of the settlement project. Peres won forty per cent of the delegates’ votes, conceded, and was named Defense Minister. Rabin would later brand Peres an “indefatigable schemer.” When, in 1976, Rabin planned to remove by force a Jewish outpost in the hills of Samaria, in the northern West Bank, Peres intervened to let it stay.

Rabin resigned over a minor financial infraction just before the election of May, 1977. Peres, his replacement, debated Menachem Begin, of the Likud Party, on television, insisting that it was the labor pioneers who knew how to settle the land. Begin won, concluded the Camp David Accords with Egypt in 1979, and increased the number of settlers to about ten thousand by 1981. Begin won reëlection that year, by increasing subsidies for staples and slashing tariffs on imported consumer products, setting off a spending spree among his poorer and less educated base. By 1984, government deficits, worsened by the Lebanon War, had pushed inflation to more than four hundred per cent.

The election that year produced a tie for Peres, and he assumed the Prime Minister’s job for two years, in a rotation agreement with Yitzhak Shamir. This proved to be Peres’s finest hour, as he worked tirelessly with respected economists to prevent economic collapse and to enable future growth, privatizing or closing failing public companies and encouraging private investment. He introduced a new shekel, pegging it to the dollar, while imposing austerity and wage and price controls. He confidently oriented the economy toward technology exports, focussed on the defense technologies he had nurtured, reinvested in the universities, and advocated for tax holidays to encourage investment by foreign technology corporations such as Intel, Motorola, and I.B.M. By 1991, the chairman of Intel-Israel, Dov Frohman, told me that the country was primed to become a home to technology startups: “four for every direct foreign investor.”

In the fall of 1993, I met with Peres, who was the Foreign Minister in the new Rabin government at the time, in New York. I was working for a consulting firm founded by, among others, the Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter. When I entered the room, Peres had Porter’s “Competitive Advantage” in his hands. He started off subdued, businesslike, but his face brightened when I asked how the state might facilitate an export-driven economy. He told me what many would later come to believe, that the competitive advantage Israel’s military gave it was not in its technology but in the “human capital” that the Army experience created: the teamwork, the comfort with advanced machinery. He spoke of Israel as a hub of a “new Middle East,” the name of a book he published that same year, which argued that economic integration, based on scientific exchange, had made war obsolete.

At the same time, political vanity caused Peres to miss opportunities to build that new Middle East. In 1987, shortly before the first intifada roiled the Palestinian territories, Peres, who was serving as Foreign Minister under Shamir, secretly negotiated a deal with King Hussein’s representatives in London, which would have brought Jordan into the peace process and halted settlement building. Peres promised Hussein that, if Shamir rejected the deal, he would resign and mount an electoral campaign on the issue. Shamir did reject it, Peres did not resign, and Hussein renounced all interest in representing Palestinian claims.

Peres was the indispensable proponent of the Oslo Accords with the Palestine Liberation Organization. But Oslo never produced a final-status agreement, and Rabin and Peres were put on the defensive by terror attacks and settler violence. After Rabin’s assassination, in 1995, Peres became Prime Minister, and the polls showed that he would have won an overwhelming victory over Benjamin Netanyahu had he called an immediate election. But Peres seemed determined first to prove that he could be charged with the nation’s security. He put the election off until the spring, and secretly authorized a series of retaliatory operations against Hamas terrorists, which led to retaliatory bus bombings. During the early spring, he authorized an action against Hezbollah in the north, Operation Grapes of Wrath, which included an errant strike against a Lebanese town in which more than a hundred civilians were killed. When an election was held in May, he lost to Netanyahu by less than a per cent. By the time Ehud Barak regained power for Oslo’s advocates, in 1999, the climate had been soured by settlement growth and terror, and in 2000 a new intifada broke out.

Thereafter, Peres was something of a shadow figure in Israeli politics, taking back interim leadership of Labor in 2004, and eventually joining with Sharon and Ehud Olmert in forming yet a new party, Kadima, in 2005. After Sharon’s death, Olmert formed a government and organized a Knesset vote to elect Peres to the Presidency, a largely honorific role, but one the outsider seemed to thrive in, inviting “famous and influential names,” as he had once put it, to his official residence, encouraging ethnic integration, and promoting large entrepreneurial projects: the electric car, a canal joining the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea. He seemed to revel in the idea that he’d never again face an election.

One is hard-pressed to know what was happening in the shadows, or to assess what political courage he had left. The late Ron Pundak, former head of the Peres Center and one of Oslo’s negotiators, told me just before his death, in 2014, that Peres had him deposed for his anti-government peace activities after 2009, “convinced that Netanyahu was serious about making progress toward a two-state solution.” Later in 2014, as his term as President was ending, Peres told Channel Two that he had met with the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, in Jordan three years before, and that the two had worked out a comprehensive peace deal, including recognition of Israel as a “Jewish state.” Netanyahu, Peres claimed, had “stopped it.”

Why did Peres not resign and expose the matter? Why, too, did he draw close to powerful mentors, adapt to new parties, take only the most calculated risks, and shift with the winds of war and peace? “Shimon never seemed far from the center of things, but felt himself the outsider,” Yael Dayan told me. “Shimon was the immigrant who knew the language well, who thought himself a man of letters. But he spoke with an accent; he had a certain paranoia.” The outsider’s restlessness seemed critical here. “Shimon was endlessly curious about the sciences, taught himself what he didn’t know: in chemistry, hydrology, nanotechnology, economics,” Dayan added. “He saw the Israel he wanted: advanced, democratic, multicultural, at peace. He did what he could to set the stage for it.”

Friday, September 30, 2016

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's key Wing Men one and all prefer Hillary Clinton for the 45th President of the USA ..... now even more than in June 2016



The Prime Minister knows Israel needs a US president who is measured, consistent and credible, all qualities Trump lacks.

Trump Netanyahu and Clinton. (photo credit:REUTERS)

This article is based on one and one conversations with Benjamin Netanyahu's key wing men DoreGold ( Director General f the Foreign Ministry) , Danny Danon ( UN Ambassador) Ron Dermer ( USA Ambassador ) , Michael Oren ( Previously Ambassador to the US)  Tzipi Hotelevy ( Deputy Foreign Minister) and the Cabinet Ministers  Tzachi Hanegbi , Avi Dichter,Yuli-Yoel Edelstein,Zeev Elkin,Gilad Erdan.and Yuval Steinitz and just in the interest of complete disclosure , I have been a member of  the Likud Central Committee since 1988.

In his heart of hearts, and certainly not to be discussed with his political sugar daddy Sheldon Adelson, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is probably hoping for a Hillary Clinton victory in November’s US presidential election. And despite what former New York City mayor Rudi Giuliani believes, Israel’s right-wing leader will prefer dealing with the first woman president in America’s history than the flamboyant, uncontrollable and unpredictable Republican candidate Donald Trump.

Netanyahu hates surprises, and Trump’s whole candidacy has been one huge surprise, from his decision to run, his winning the Republican nomination and his sudden surge in the head-to-head polls against Clinton. More pertinently for Netanyahu, no one has a real clue as to where Trump stands on issues of vital importance to Israel.


Trump’s flirtation with Russian President Vladimir Putin, unlike our own Avigdor Liberman’s embarrassing endorsement of Putin’s democratic credentials when Liberman was foreign minister, would seriously endanger the West, and by extension Israel, were Trump ever get to sit in the Oval Office. A strengthening of Russia’s standing at the expense of the US would have serious knock-on effects in the Middle East, in particular boosting Russia’s de facto allies Iran and Hezbollah.

More widely, Trump’s willingness to discuss recognizing Russia’s land grab in the Crimean and his threats to weaken NATO would be a disastrous reshuffling of the post-Cold War order. Trump’s strident isolationism will certainly be setting off alarm bells in the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. Take a look at Trump’s remarks regarding his commitment to the NATO alliance: “I want to keep NATO , but I want them to pay,” Trump told a rally in Scranton, Pennsylvania, last week.

“I don’t want to be taken advantage of... We’re protecting countries that most of the people in this room have never even heard of and we end up in World War Three? ...Give me a break.”

In the past, Trump has also talked of his willingness to “walk” if countries like Japan, Germany or Saudi Arabia do not pay the full cost for American troops stationed in their countries.


Given Israel’s reliance on American military aid, this is certainly not music to Netanyahu’s ears. It’s surely no coincidence that after dragging his heels for over year, convinced he could get a better deal from the next US administration, Netanyahu has suddenly switched gears and begun to move decisively to reach an agreement with President Barack Obama over the next 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on US military aid to Israel.

With a reported $40 billion at stake, Netanyahu has belatedly realized it is not in Israel’s interest for this huge package to become a political football in what promises to be an exceptionally divisive American election campaign. For all Netanyahu and his supporters’ attempts to falsify history and portray Obama as the most anti-Israel US president in recent history, this MoU, once signed, will set the seal on Obama’s pro-Israel legacy and his commitment to Israel’s security.

Israel needs a US president who is measured, consistent and credible, all qualities Trump has already shown he lacks. Shooting from the hip on Twitter is amusing, from the Oval Office it would be a nightmare.

One day Trump says he is “neutral” on Israel and Palestine, and suggests that Israeli obstinacy is behind the difficulty of securing peace: “A lot will have to do with Israel and whether or not Israel wants to make the deal – whether or not Israel’s willing to sacrifice certain things.”

The next day (when he happens to be addressing the AIPAC convention) he insists he “will move the American embassy to the eternal capital of the Jewish people, Jerusalem,” if elected president, a promise regularly made but never kept by would-be American presidents. The Trump-inspired removal of support for the two-state solution from the Republican platform then places the party to the Right of Netanyahu, and offers no insight into resolving the Israel- Palestine conflict.

With Clinton, on the other hand, Netanyahu knows exactly what’s in store – more of the same, and from the prime minister’s perspective, what’s not to like? Despite the clear ideological differences between Netanyahu and Obama, and the clash over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the latter’s administration has never wavered in its support for Israel when it really mattered for Jerusalem.

And neither will Clinton. Her record as a senator and secretary of state is one of a clear supporter of Israel. Under her stewardship, the State Department increased military assistance for Israel every year, from $2.55b. when she took office to $3.1b. in FY2013, a nearly 20 percent increase, while diplomatically she ensured the United States blocked UN Security Council resolutions for Palestinian statehood.

Clinton and Netanyahu might not be friends, but Israel doesn’t need friends, it needs strong allies. A Trump presidency will see a weakening of US alliances across the world as America turns inwards, which is precisely the opposite of what Israel needs.