Jewish Population of the Shomron is now 420,899 and expected to reach 500,000 during #OyVeyDonaldTrump's Presidency ( provided he keep his AIPAC promises)

 Israeli settlement of Maaleh Adumim looms over Arab Bedouin shacks in the West Bank, Sunday, Jan. 22, 2017. Yaakov Katz, a prominent West Bank settler, said Sunday, March 26, 2017, that the number of Israelis living in the West Bank has soared by nearly one quarter over the past five years to over 420,000 people. Katz says the rapid growth means the internationally backed idea of a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians is now impossible. (AP Photo/Mahmoud Illean, File)

JERUSALEM (AP) — The number of Israeli settlers living in the West Bank has soared by nearly one-quarter over the past five years to over 420,000 people, a prominent settler leader said Sunday, presenting new population figures that he said put to rest the internationally backed idea of a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians.

Yaakov Katz issued his report as the Israeli government is locked in negotiations with the Trump administration over understandings that are expected to include some curbs on settlement construction.

"We are talking about a situation that is unchangeable," he said Sunday. "It's very important to know the numbers, and the numbers are growing."

According to Katz, the settler population hit 420,899 on Jan. 1, up 3.6 percent from 406,332 people a year earlier and a 23-percent increase from 342,414 at the beginning of 2012.

Katz said the numbers were based on data from the Interior Ministry that have not yet been made public. The ministry, which oversees the country's population registry, had no comment. But Peace Now, an anti-settlement watchdog group, said the numbers appeared reasonable.

The figures are being published on a new website sponsored by Bet El Institutions, a settler organization that counts members of President Donald Trump's inner circle among its supporters.

Katz's figures did not include settlement construction in east Jerusalem, where more than 200,000 Israelis now live. Altogether, he said the population growth — which is nearly double the 2-percent nationwide rate of annual population growth — means the settlements are "irreversible," he said.

"Whatever Angela Merkel or Trump or anybody else is thinking about, it belongs to the past, not to the future," he said.

Israel captured the West Bank, along with east Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, in the 1967 Mideast war. The Palestinians seek all three areas for a future independent state.

Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, leading to the takeover of the territory by the Islamic militant group Hamas two years later. Israel and Egypt have maintained a blockade over Gaza since then. Israel says the policy is needed to prevent Hamas from building up its arsenal of weapons. Critics condemn it as collective punishment.

For the past two decades, the international community has overwhelmingly backed the idea of a two-state solution as the best way of reaching peace in the region and rejected Israeli settlements as obstacles to peace.

Without an independent Palestinian state, the thinking goes, Israel will remain in control over millions of Palestinians who do not have equal rights, forcing it to choose between its Jewish and democratic character.

Just weeks before Trump took office, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution declaring settlements illegal.


Ahmad Majdalani, a senior aide to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, said Palestinian independence is the only way to peace and remains a possibility, despite settler efforts to derail it.

"The two-state solution was possible yesterday and today and at any time. The two-state solution is not the problem," he said. "Settlements are."

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government is dominated by pro-settler hard-liners who oppose Palestinian statehood on either security or religious grounds.

After years of clashes with President Barack Obama, Israeli hardliners have welcomed the election of Trump, who they perceive as being far more sympathetic to their cause.

Trump's platform made no mention of a Palestinian state. And during the campaign, he vowed to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a stance welcomed by Israel and opposed by the Palestinians, and signaled that he would be more tolerant of settlement construction.

But since taking office, he appears to have backpedaled. He seems to be in no rush to move the embassy, and during a White House meeting with Netanyahu last month, he urged restraint on Israeli settlement construction. He also has left the door open to a two-state solution.

A Trump envoy, Jason Greenblatt, visited the region earlier this month for introductory talks with Israelis and Palestinians. He has been working with the Israelis on a series of understandings that would limit at least some settlement construction in hopes of restarting peace talks.

Speaking to his Cabinet on Sunday, Netanyahu said there was still no agreement. "I will not go into details," he said. "Our talks with the White House are continuing. I hope they will conclude quickly."

Katz, widely known by his nickname "Ketzeleh," is one of the founders and most prominent figures in the West Bank settler movement. He is a former member of parliament and led a hard-line nationalist party.

Bet El is a religious settlement north of Jerusalem. Katz's organization sponsors a well-known Jewish seminary and "Arutz Sheva," a pro-settler news agency.

Official U.S. records show that its donors have included the family foundation of Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and confidant; David Friedman, his new ambassador to Israel; and Trump himself.

Friedman, a former fund-raiser for the Bet El Institutions, was narrowly confirmed last week as ambassador after a tough battle that included fierce opposition from dovish Jewish American groups.

Katz expressed faith that Trump would remain supportive and described the new ambassador as a "great American patriot."

"The American people will be very proud of him," he said.

Bibi Netanyahu's honeymoon with #OyVeyDonadlTrump's over.... caput

This was supposed to be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's victory lap.

After a combined 10 years leading the government, he finally had a Republican president in the White House, with a Republican House and Senate to boot. It should have been the perfect match for Netanyahu's right-wing coalition.

The prime minister would be free of the condemnation of construction in West Bank and East Jerusalem settlements that became routine under former President Barack Obama, the right wing believed. President Donald Trump would allow Israel to build and build freely.

US, Israel move closer to agreement to curb settlements

Within 10 days of Trump's inauguration, Israel approved plans for more than 6,000 housing units in settlements as well as the first brand-new settlement municipality in the West Bank in nearly two decades.

Heaping praise upon Trump at their first news conference together in Washington, Netanyahu said: "There is no greater supporter of the Jewish people and the Jewish state." Vice President Mike Pence is expected to also receive a warm reception when he addresses the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) at its large annual conference in Washington, which begins on Sunday.

And the settlement movement rejoiced at the new White House leadership.

"I think (Trump) loves Israel," said Chaim Silberstein, spokesman for the Beit El settlement outside of Ramallah. "I think he loves the biblical heartland of Israel, which is here." Some even spoke in messianic terms.

President Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump welcome Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his wife, Sara, as they arrive at the White House in Washington, DC, on February 15, 2017

Education Minister Naftali Bennett, head of the right-wing Jewish Home party and one of the most outspoken Israeli opponents of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, declared after the elections, "The era of a Palestinian state is over."

But for Netanyahu, the honeymoon period lasted less than two months.

Trump quickly walked back his oft-repeated campaign promise to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and he criticized Israeli settlements as "not good" for peace.

At their joint White House appearance, Trump told Netanyahu to "hold back on settlements for a bit." Trump wanted a chance to conclude what he called "the ultimate deal": peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

On Thursday, after two rounds of talks spanning the US and the Middle East, the White House put out a statement saying that the American delegation "reiterated President Trump's concerns regarding settlement activity in the context of moving towards a peace agreement," adding, "The Israeli delegation made clear that Israel's intent going forward is to adopt a policy regarding settlement activity that takes those concerns into consideration."

The West Bank settlement with close ties to Trump's Israel envoy

Netanyahu now finds himself walking a tight-rope between a new president interested in a peace deal and an empowered right-wing determined to sink the two-state solution once and for all. In the face of this political pressure and a corruption investigation, it is increasingly possible that the Israeli leader may soon have to face elections.

Ever the cautious politician, Netanyahu had previously warned his governing coalition -- which includes Jewish Home and Netanyahu's own Likud Party -- not to celebrate too much over Trump's victory. He even forbade his ministers, Bennett included, from speaking to Washington officials without his approval, especially about settlements and annexation.

But after Trump's inauguration, Israel's right-wing felt there was no reason to hold back. The pressure on Netanyahu from Jewish Home and even those within Likud kept growing.

For Netanyahu, building in the settlements isn't just a promise he's made to the approximately 420,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank; it is also about long-term political survival, as Netanyahu and Bennett battle for the same right-wing constituency.

Netanyahu has boasted that there is no government that will be more pro-settlement than the current one, and he can't afford to be outflanked on the right by his own coalition partners. At the same time, no Israeli leader -- on the right or left -- would risk angering Israel's primary international ally.

"I think we can say now what is clear is that if the right in Israel thought that Mr. Trump is going to join Mr. Bennett's party, it made a very grave mistake," Yehuda Ben Meir, a principal research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies told CNN. "As I think any intelligent person can realize, Donald Trump is President of the United States. The United States has interests throughout the world."

Committee clears Trump's nominee for ambassador to Israel

Ben Meir continued, "To a certain degree, Mr. Netanyahu has really locked himself into this dilemma, and we will have to see how he maneuvers through it. ... It depends on what is the position of President Trump. It's not clear yet."

The tension was evident in mid-March in Netanyahu's first meeting with Jason Greenblatt, Trump's special envoy for international negotiations.

Greenblatt, who served as Trump's business attorney before becoming an adviser on Israel, may have seemed likely to be in sync with the Israeli Prime Minister. Before the elections, he wrote an op-ed for CNN insisting that Trump would recognize Jerusalem as the eternal, undivided capital of Israel and would move the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Those moves, warned the Palestinian leadership that sees East Jerusalem as its capital in any future Palestinian state, would essentially sink the process of forging a two-state solution.

In a meeting that lasted more than five hours, Greenblatt and Netanyahu reaffirmed the strong bond between the United States and Israel, with the former emphasizing Trump's commitment to Israel's security. But the statement addressing the settlements issued Thursday made clear that the US is looking for Israel to rein in construction.

So far, the parties have not found a framework for settlement construction acceptable to Trump and Netanyahu. After marathon meetings between Greenblatt, Netanyahu Chief of Staff Yoav Horowitz and Israeli Ambassador to the US Ron Dermer, the two sides still had not finalized an agreement. Trump's "concerns regarding settlement activity" remained. So did Netanyahu's desire to keep building.

One day after Netanyahu's first meeting with Greenblatt, Trump's envoy met Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah. According to a readout of that meeting, Abbas stressed the Palestinian commitment to a two-state solution, while Greenblatt emphasized Trump's desire for peace through direct negotiations.

The statement mentioned the possibility of a meeting in Washington between Abbas and Trump -- which would only ratchet up the pressure on Netanyahu to make concessions if Abbas presents himself as a partner for peace, willing to compromise for the sake of an agreement.

Israel's right, however, wants to move in the other direction. During Greenblatt's visit earlier in the month, politicians from Jewish Home and Likud had planned to introduce a bill to annex Ma'ale Adumim, a West Bank settlement just outside Jerusalem.

Israel has never annexed any part of the West Bank it captured in the 1967 war outside of East Jerusalem. Israeli settlements there are illegal under international law, though Israel disputes this on historical and religious grounds.

"Trump is genuinely interested in making peace. He's been very consistent about that. I think he sees it as a personal challenge," said Chemi Shalev, a senior columnist with Haaretz, an Israeli daily newspaper. "And he had to get over bad relations with Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, and part of that is that the Saudis have made it clear to him that if he's thinking of creating (a regional) anti-Iranian bloc, at least part of that has to be a semblance of a peace process with the Palestinians."

To some degree, President Barack Obama's deep opposition to settlements helped Netanyahu navigate the thorny politics of the issue. It gave him the political cover to satisfy the right wing with only small steps on settlements -- making the case that he could do not more -- so that he didn't face major blowback from the US, international community and Israeli center and left.

Trump is making some signs that he's no fan of settlements either, but the right doesn't see his opposition as stiff enough to warrant Netanyahu caving in and therefore is unlikely to be satisfied with small steps. (For one thing, both the President and his pick for ambassador to Israel have given money to the Beit El settlement's schools.)

The current term of Israel's government runs until late 2019. Few think it will last that long.

In addition to the political pressure Netanyahu faces, he is under criminal investigation in a corruption probe, suspected of receiving gifts from overseas businessmen. So far, he has been questioned by police four times, though police and the attorney general's office have been guarded with information about the investigation.

Netanyahu has sworn the investigations will lead to nothing, as they did when he was investigated in his first term as prime minister in the late '90s. But an indictment would put political and public pressure on him to step down despite his promise not to do so. Under Israeli law, he has to step down only if he is convicted and if that conviction is upheld through the appeals process.

As the investigation inches along, election fever is in the air. Three parties have called for early primaries.

Netanyahu's former defense minister, Moshe Ya'alon, announced he has split off from the Likud to form his own party. Yair Lapid, head of the Yesh Atid centrist party and one of Netanyahu's primary rivals, has been running even with Netanyahu's party in recent polls. Right-wing Agriculture Minister Uri Ariel has promised to leave Netanyahu's coalition if the premier agrees to any limitation on settlement construction.

"Even though (the coalition) doesn't want elections, there's a growing sense that elections may be around the corner in any case, and in that case the Jewish Home will press on with the annexation of Ma'ale Adumim and will attack whatever arrangements Netanyahu has with Trump," said Shalev. "It'll go from bad to worse from the point of view of the stability of the coalition."

Netanyahu himself threatened elections one week ago, despite strenuous objections from his coalition and his own party. Critics have pointed out that calling an election would also, under Israeli law, freeze the criminal investigation of Netanyahu. It may also be a way of keeping the smaller parties in the coalition in line.

It is a sign of the instability in a government that was supposed to be reinforced by Trump's victory, not undermined. Netanyahu finds himself trying to balance the demands of his own coalition with the unpredictable expectations of a president who is not the partner Israel's right wing thought it was getting.

Legendary tomb of Jesus resurrected

A Greek restoration team has completed its renovation of the Edicule where, according to Christian tradition, Jesus was buried after his crucifixion.



After centuries of disrepair, one of Christianity’s holiest sites returns to life.

Believed by the devout to house the tomb of Jesus Christ, Jerusalem’s Church of the Holy Sepulchre will open to the public on Wednesday after nearly a year of restoration. An ongoing dispute between the religious groups controlling the site had brought the burial place, known as the Edicule, to the brink of collapse.

"We are at the critical moment for rehabilitating the Edicule," director of the restoration Antonia Moropoulou told National Geographic. "The techniques we're using to document this unique monument will enable the world to study our findings as if they themselves were in the tomb of Christ."

Centuries-long cycles of ruin and restoration have afflicted the structure. An earthquake damaged the shrine in 1927, and the British carried out external repairs in 1947, but it took a warning from Israeli authorities that the building was becoming unsafe to prompt the controlling groups to set aside their differences and allow proper repairs to proceed.

Ever since a 1752 Ottoman Turkish edict, six Christian groups (Roman Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Copts, and Ethiopians) have shared jurisdiction over the church in an uneasy truce known as the "Status Quo."

Tensions between the denominations run high, even in modern times. In 2002 an ecclesiastical fistfight broke out after an Egyptian (Coptic) monk shifted his chair into the shade, allegedly violating Ethiopian territory. The more complicated task of negotiating invasive repairs to the holy site was a stumbling block for decades.

But the aging structure's decay paid no heed to the squabbles of man, forcing their hand. “If this intervention hadn’t happened now, there is a very great risk that there could have been a collapse,” Bonnie Burnham of the World Monuments Fund told CBS. “This is a complete transformation of the monument.”

As part of the restoration, a team from the National Technical University of Athens has removed the marble that covered the tomb for at least 500 years, revealing a treasure trove of material for scientists and historians of early Christianity.

“It will be a long scientific analysis, but we will finally be able to see the original rock surface on which, according to tradition, the body of Christ was laid," said Fredrik Hiebert, archaeologist-in-residence at the National Geographic Society, a partner in the restoration project.

Dr. Hiebert refers to one target of intense interest, the limestone shelf where Christ’s body was brought after his crucifixion in 30 A.D., according to Christian tradition. Followers who came to the tomb three days later found it empty after his resurrection, the story goes.

Starting Wednesday, for the first time in centuries tourists and pilgrims will be able to follow in the footsteps of these early Christians, witnessing the interior of the holy site with their own eyes.

Each stakeholder contributed to the project, which came in at over $4 million, including personal gifts from Jordan's King Abdullah II and architectural designer Mica Ertegun.

Despite centuries of conflict, some see seeds of peace in this cooperation wrought of necessity.

"I'm glad that the atmosphere is special, there is a hidden joy," Theophilos III, the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem, told National Geographic. "Here we have Franciscans, Armenians, Greeks, Muslim guards, and Jewish police officers. We hope and we pray that this will be a real message that the impossible can become the possible. We all need peace and mutual respect."

Assault on Westminster .Terrorist At the Heart of Power in London Tel Aviv City Hall illuminated as the Union Jack, in solidarity with the city of London and the British people. United we stand

Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, with funding from the European Union (EU).A majority of Israelis (55%) and a large minority of Palestinians (44%) support the two-state solution. By contrast, support for a one-state solution stands at 36% among Palestinians, 19% among Israeli Jews and 56% among Israeli Arabs. Support for a detailed permanent agreement package, one based on previous rounds of negotiations, is lower than the support for the two-state solution.

Palestinian-Israeli Pulse

A majority of Israelis and just under half of Palestinians still support the two state solution in principle, but under half on both sides support the detailed framework for its implementation.  However, despite mutual fear, distrust and pessimism regarding the likelihood and feasibility of the two-state solution, a majority of Palestinians and Israelis may support comprehensive peace agreement that ends the conflict if offered additional symbolic or concrete incentives

Table of findings 

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, with funding from the European Union (EU).

MAIN HIGHLIGHTS

• A majority of Israelis (55%) and a large minority of Palestinians (44%) support the two-state solution. By contrast, support for a one-state solution stands at 36% among Palestinians, 19% among Israeli Jews and 56% among Israeli Arabs.
• Support for a detailed permanent agreement package, one based on previous rounds of negotiations, is lower than the support for the two-state solution. Only 42% of Palestinians, 41% of  Israeli Jews, and 88% of Israeli Arabs support a peace agreement package that comprises:  a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, a family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine,  the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the conflict and claims.
• A quarter to one-third of  Israelis and Palestinians who oppose the permanent agreement package are willing to  reconsider their opposition to the peace deal if it was accompanied by a peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Initiative's  principles (for the Israeli public), and an Israeli acceptance of that initiative (for the Palestinian public).  This incentive alone increases the overall support for the combined package on both sides, up to 57% to 59%, when those who changed their minds are added to the original supporters. While some of the incentives presented to those who opposed the package manage to change the attitude of fewer people, others, including non-zero sum ones, presented separately to each side, are able to change the attitude of many more people, 40% and above of the opposition, thereby considerably increasing the support to the combined package to much higher levels, up to 65% on both sides.  
• In selecting between bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral approaches to peacemaking, Palestinians prefer the multilateral (51%) while the Israelis prefer the bilateral (61%). Of various multilateral forums, an Arab forum, in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate, is the least rejected by the two sides. All other multilateral forums – an American-led, an EU-led, a US-Russian led, or an UN-led forum –  are acceptable to one side while unacceptable to the other.
• Two-thirds of the Israelis and more than three quarters of the Palestinians view US President Donald Trump as pro-Israel. Moreover, a minority on both sides, 28% of Israeli Jews and 10% of Palestinians, think he will seek to renew peace negotiations
• Large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians estimate as low the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years.

The Palestinian sample size was 1,270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 8 and 10, 2016. Number of interviewees in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) is 830 and in the Gaza Strip 440. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 1,207 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between December 19 and 30, 2016. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 727, West Bank settlers 300, and Israeli Arabs 180. Size of Israeli settlers and Israeli Arabs was deliberately increased in order to allow for detailed analysis of their attitudes. But the combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these two groups in the Israeli society. The data file was further reweighted to reflect current societal religious-secular division. The margin of error is 3%.  The following summary has been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki and Walid Ladadwa from PSR, and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin together with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and its director, Dr. Ephraim Lavie.

MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews living inside the Green Line and settlers living in the West Bank, or between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provided the respective findings for these sub groups.  

(1) Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Two-state solution, one-state solution, and two-state confederation: Today, a majority of Israelis and a large minority of Palestinians– 55% of Israelis (50% among Jews and 82% among Arabs) and 44% of Palestinians – support what is known as the two-state solution in a general question testing the concept, but without giving specific details about an agreement. Six months ago, in June 2016, 59% of Israelis (53% among Jews and 87% among Arabs) and 51% of Palestinians supported that solution. We asked Palestinians and Israelis to assess the majority view on their side and on the other side regarding this solution. Findings indicate that that the Israelis underestimate and incorrectly assess the level of support for this solution on their side while the Palestinians correctly estimate the level of support on their side: only 26% of the Israelis said the majority of their own public supports while 63% of the Israelis said the majority opposes it; among the Palestinians, 41% said a majority supports and 53% said a majority opposes it. But while the Israelis correctly estimate the level of support for the concept of the two-state solution on the other side, the Palestinians underestimate the level of support for that solution among the Israelis: only 33% of the Palestinians believe the majority of Israelis supports that solution and 38% of the Israelis believe the majority of Palestinians supports it.  However, wide majorities are skeptical about the implementation of such a solution. Over 80% of Israeli Jews and 72% of Palestinians do not believe a Palestinian state will be established in the next five years.

The joint poll sought to ascertain the current level of support for the idea of a one-state solution “by which Palestinians and Jews will be citizens of the same state and enjoy equal rights.” Support for the idea is highest among Israeli Arabs (standing at 56%). Only a minority among Palestinians (36%) and among Israeli Jews (19%) support this option (although 26% of settlers supported the one-state solution). When we asked Israeli Jews if they are for or against the annexation of the West Bank without granting the Palestinians their full citizen rights, two thirds said they are against it and only 31% said they support it. Forty-six percent of settlers supported annexation without full rights for Palestinians (almost precisely the same portion, 45%, of settlers are opposed).

We also sought to assess the level of support for the idea of a confederation between the state of Israel and the state of Palestine whereby citizens of one country would be free to reside in the territory of the other and live under its own laws and where two the states jointly decide on matters of political, security and economic policy. As the case in the one-state solution, support for the confederation idea is highest among Israeli Arabs (standing at 74%, significantly higher than Israeli Arab support for a one-state solution). But only a minority of Palestinians (34%) and Israeli Jews (20%) support the idea.

Permanent status package: For the second time in six months, we presented Palestinians and Israelis with a detailed combined package of a permanent settlement, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and asked them if they would support or oppose each of its components and the combined package. Findings show that the level of support for the package has increased slightly on both sides: 48% of the Israelis (41% among Israeli Jews and 88% among Israeli Arabs) and 42% of the Palestinians (40% among West Bankers and 46% among Gazans) support the combined package. Six months ago, only 39% of Israeli Jews and 39% of Palestinians supported the package. Current findings indicate that the majority on both sides, 56% of Israeli Jews and 55% of Palestinians, continue to oppose the combined package, if offered to them without any other additional incentives (see below the section on incentives).

A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the nine components of the package follows:

1. Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis and Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side: a minority among the Palestinians (43%) and a majority among the Israelis (69%; 66% among Israeli Jews and 84% among Israeli Arabs) supported this item.

2. A demilitarized independent Palestinian state will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: a minority of Palestinians (22%; 29% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) and a majority (56%) among Israelis supported this item.

3. A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides: among the Palestinians, a minority (42%) supported it, and among the Israelis, a majority (53%) supported it.

4. The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years: on both sides only a minority supported this item: on the Palestinian side 35% (29% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip) and among the Israelis, 44% (42% among Israeli Jews and 57% among Israeli Arabs).

5. The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlements, which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements: a minority (37%) among the Palestinians (33% in the West Bank and 45% in the Gaza Strip), and 50% among the Israelis supported it (among the Israeli Jews 48% supported it).

6. The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel: minorities on both sides (31%) among the Palestinians (34% in the Gaza Strip and 29% in the West Bank) and 47% of Israelis supported it. (The Israeli Jews were split: 45% supported it while 48% opposed it).

7. West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of a Palestinian state: again, minorities – among the Palestinian 27% and among the Israelis 36% (29% among Israeli Jews and 76% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

8. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Western Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount/al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty: a minority (28%) among Palestinians and a similar minority (37%) among Israelis (33% among Israeli Jews and 63% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

9. Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated: among the Palestinians, 52% (50% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip) supported it and among the Israelis, 30% (20% among Israeli Jews and 81% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

It is worth noting that among Israeli Jews, support for the combined package among settlers stands at 16% compared to 42% among non-settlers. Support is much higher among Israeli Jews who define themselves as secular, standing at 61% compared to 34% among traditionalists (masortim), 9% among the religious, and 10% among the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox). Secular people make up the plurality of Israeli Jews, with roughly 45%; about one-third of Jews are traditional, and under one-quarter are religious (orthodox) or Haredi. Among Israelis, support also varies depending on where respondents place themselves on the right-left political continuum: Among Jews, 89% of the left, 47% of the center, and 18% of the right support the package.

Among the Palestinians, as we saw six months ago, support for the combined package is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. But it is worth pointing out however that the findings show no difference in support between refugees and non-refugees (43% and 42% respectively). Nonetheless, residents of refugee camps (estimated to be less than 60% of all refugees) are the least supportive of the combined package, standing at 38% compared to 42% among residents of cities and 49% in rural areas. Moreover, support for the package is higher among those who define themselves as “not religious” and “somewhat religious” (64% and 47%) compared to those who define themselves as religious (35%); and among Fatah voters (64%) compared to Hamas voters (21%).

Beyond this regular demographic and political differences that typically signify support or opposition to peace, background attitudes also affect support. Among Israelis who believe that a majority of Palestinians support the two-state solution, support for the combined package is higher than among those who believe that a majority of Palestinians opposes that solution (53% to 33%). These comparisons are closely similar to those found in our previous joint poll six months ago. As in the Israeli case, support for the combined package is significantly higher among those Palestinians who believe that a majority of Israelis supports the two-state solution compared to those who believe that an Israeli majority is opposed to that solution (52% vs. 34%).

Peace Incentives: Our joint poll sought to explore the extent to which the opposition to the combined package was “firm” or “flexible.” For this end, we offered those who opposed the package various incentives in an attempt to understand the source of their opposition and the extent to which change was possible. Israeli Jews opposed to the package (56% of the total Jewish sample) were offered eight different incentives and Palestinians and Israeli Arabs opposed to the package (55% of all Palestinians, and 9% of the Israeli Arabs) were offered seven incentives in total. Only three of the incentives offered to the two sides were identical or almost identical. The remaining incentives sought to address either presumed Palestinian or Israeli concerns.  In this regard, it should be noted that Israeli Arabs were offered the same four distinct incentives offered to the Palestinian respondents. Below is a detailed breakdown of the responses to the various incentives:

Israeli Incentives (offered only to those Israeli Jews and Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined package):

1. And if the Jews who left their homes and property in the Arab countries when they had to leave following the 1948 War and the establishment of the state of Israel will be compensated for the lost assets left behind? 40% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

2. And if the Palestinians acknowledge the historic and religious links between Jews and historic Palestine? 34% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment. 

3. What if the agreement includes recognition by the Palestinian state of Israel as a Jewish state? 32% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

4. And if the agreement would include peace with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative? 30% of Israeli Jews and 13% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept package if it included this amendment.

5. And if free movement for both sides throughout the other side’s state was assured? 24% of Israeli Jews and 50% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

6. And if the agreement guarantees that Israelis are guaranteed free access to holy sites in Jerusalem and other places? 23% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

7. And if settlers are allowed to choose to stay in their homes after the Israeli withdrawal, to keep their Israeli citizenship and at the same time have their safety guaranteed by the Palestinian state? 21% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

8. And if the holy sites are not under Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty but are placed under the custody of a multi-national committee made up of Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the US? 10% of Israeli Jews and 31% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

In short, on the Israeli Jewish side a minority ranging between 10% and 40% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it were certain conditions to be met. On the Israeli Arab side, 13% to 50% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it based on the incentives offered to both Jews and Arab Israelis.  

Palestinian incentives in addition to the combined package (offered only to Palestinians/Israeli Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined package):  

• 1. And if Palestinian laborers can freely work in Israel after the establishment of the Palestinian state?  44% of Palestinians and 47% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
  2. And if the state of Israel acknowledges the historic and religious links between Palestinians and historic Palestine?  44% of Palestinians and 38% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
  3. And if refugees in camps in the Palestinian state are compensated and provided with homes and land in which they can be settled and rehabilitated? 42% of Palestinians and 56% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
  4. And if free movement for both sides throughout the other side’s state was assured?  40% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
  5. And if the peace agreement between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel is based on a long term hudna between the two sides? 34% of Palestinians and 31% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment;.
  6. If Israel agreed to accept the Arab peace initiative and in return all Arab countries supported this peace treaty?  28% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
  7. And if the holy sites are not under Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty but are placed under the custody of a multi-national committee made up of Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the US?  19% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
  In short, on the Palestinian side, a minority ranging between 19% and 44% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it. On the Israeli Arab side, 31% to 56% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it.

As the findings detailed above indicate, of the three identical or almost identical incentives, a broader regional peace involving the Arab World and Israel is the least mutually opposed, as 30% of Israeli Jews and 28% of Palestinians who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept a package with this amendment. This incentive alone increases the level of support for it among Palestinians from the initial 42% to 57% and among Israeli Jews from the initial 41% to 58%. Of the distinct Palestinian incentives, three proved highly effective leading 42% to 44% of the opposition to change its view and accept the package: access to Israeli labor market for Palestinian laborers, an Israeli acknowledgement of the historic and religious links between Palestinians and historic Palestine, and granting refugees homes and land in the Palestinian state.  On the Israeli side, the most effective incentive, reversing the attitude of 40% of the opposition, proved to be the compensation of Jews from Arab countries for the lost assets left behind. On both sides, gestures of symbolic recognition of their historical attachment, identity and experience are among the more powerful motivator for changing attitudes in support of the package.  

(2) Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Bilateral vs. multilateral approaches: We explored issues related to the process of peacemaking, specifically the most effective or “most promising” approaches to reviving Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the role of outside actors. In selecting between two possible approaches, bilateral and multilateral, findings show that Palestinians and Israeli Arabs prefer the multilateral, while the Israeli Jews prefer bilateral between the Israeli government and the Palestinians.

Among the Palestinians (51%) and among the Israeli Arabs (52%) preferred a multilateral forum in which major powers sponsor the negotiations, while only 27% of the Israelis Jews preferred this approach. Only 29% of the Palestinians preferred bilateral negotiations while 61% of the Israeli Jews preferred this approach.

We also sought a deeper understanding of Israeli and Palestinian views of the multilateral approach. Five models of this approach were presented to the two publics: 1) an Arab forum in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate; 2) an American-led peace process; 3) an EU-led peace process; 4) a UN-led peace process; 5) and finally, a US-Russian-led peace process. Findings show that Palestinians are most receptive to the first, or Arab regional, approach (31%) followed by a UN and an EU approaches (14% and 13% respectively); 7% selected the US-Russian peace process. Only 4% preferred a US-led effort. Israeli Jews preferred a US-led peace process (32%) followed by the regional approach and a US-Russian approach (18% each). The two other approaches, a UN-led process and EU-led process were selected by 5% and 4% of the Israeli Jewish public, respectively. Among Israelis Arabs, equal support (17%) went to an EU-led process, a UN-led process, and a regional process.

The Trump Administration: Our findings show that two thirds of the Israeli Jews (69%) and more than three quarters of Palestinians (77%) believe that Donald Trump is pro-Israel; 18% of the Israeli Jews and 8% of the Palestinians think he is neutral.  We asked the two sides to tell us what they expect Trump to do about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Only 28% of Israeli Jews (still a plurality, with the highest score relative to other options offered) and 10% of Palestinians think the new US president will seek to renew peace negotiations and smaller percentages (16% of Israeli Jews and 8% of the Palestinians) think he will seek to impose a solution on both sides. But almost half of the Palestinians (47%) and a quarter of all Israelis (27%) think he will side with one side against the other while 19% of the Israelis and 30% of the Palestinians think he will do nothing.

Role of Israeli Arabs in the peace process: In assessing the role of Israeli Arabs in the peace process, we asked the two sides to tell us how they view them: as Israelis or Palestinians, or both. While 63% of the Palestinians view them as Palestinians, only 23% of Israeli Jews view them as such. Among Israeli Arabs, 31% said they view themselves as Palestinians. Only 10% of Palestinians compared to 41% of Israeli Jews and 27% of Israeli Arabs view them as Israelis. About one quarter (24%) of the Palestinians and 34% of Israeli Jews, and 37% of Israeli Arabs view them as both (Palestinians and Israelis). We also asked both sides to speculate about the manner in which Israeli Arabs view the PLO and its role in the peace process: do Israeli Arabs see it as representing them and all other Palestinians or do they see it as representing other Palestinians only? About half the Palestinians (49%) think that Israeli Arabs view the PLO as their representative as well as the representative of all Palestinians with only 41% thinking that they view it as representing other Palestinians only. By contrast, about half of the Israeli Jews (49%) think that Israeli Arabs view the PLO as representing other Palestinians only; 32% of Israeli Jews think Israeli Arabs view the PLO as their representative. Israeli Arabs think the same as Israeli Jews: 63% believe that Israeli Arabs see the PLO as representing other Palestinians only; 21% believe that they see it as their representative.

Bottom-up peace efforts: We asked the two sides for their assessment of the effectiveness of grassroots movements and religious leaders in putting pressure on leaders to pursue peace. Over two-thirds of the Israeli Jewish respondents (69%) think that groups such as “Women Wage Peace” are not effective but 53% think religious leaders are. Israeli Arabs think differently when it comes to groups such as “Women Wage Peace”: 68% think they are effective. But they think the same as the Israeli Jews when it comes to religious leaders: 61% think they are effective. Among the Palestinians 49% think peace groups are not effective and 41% think they are; and 47% think men of religion are not effective and 46% think they are.

Violence and countering violence: We asked Palestinians if they support or oppose attacks, such as stabbings, on Israeli civilians: 49% opposed such attacks and 47% supported them. Opposition to such attacks in the West Bank (60%) is twice as much as it is in the Gaza Strip (30%). Although the difference could be partly explained by the fact that West Bank residents experience Israeli retaliatory measures, Palestinians are likely to deny the effects. When Palestinian respondents were asked about the deterrent effect of the Israeli measures, such as home demolitions, used against the families of the attackers, more than three quarters (78%; 84% among West Bankers and 69% among Gazans) answered that such measures do not deter potential attackers. We asked Palestinians and Israelis to assess the majority view among the Palestinians regarding such attacks. Findings indicate that a majority on both sides (53% among the Palestinians and 52% among Israeli Jews) think a majority of Palestinians support them. We asked Israeli Jews if they support harsh policies (such as prolonged closures or curfews) against all residents of a village of town from which Palestinians attacked with knives or committed other violent acts against Israelis. A majority of Israeli Jews (58%) support such harsh measures and 38% oppose them.

(3) How Israelis and Palestinians View Each Other:

We asked the two sides whether they have met or talked to each other and how they view the other. Issues raised included wanting peace, trust, fear, and how good or bad their current conditions are. But we also asked them how they view the nature of the conflict, in zero sum terms, or with some openness towards the other side. While the picture that emerges is discouraging, there are nonetheless, a few glimmers of hope.

Talking to each other:  Palestinians and Israelis were asked if they have talked with each other during the past few months: 12% of Palestinians said they have talked to Israelis, other than soldiers and settlers, and 23% of Israeli Jews and 78% of Israeli Arabs said that they have talked to Palestinians.  Among the Palestinians, 71% said the talk with the Israelis was pleasant and 95% of the Israeli Jews and the Israeli Arabs indicated the same.

Want Peace: 38% of the Palestinians and 41% of the Israeli Jews agree with a statement that the other side wants peace; 79% among Israeli Arabs agree that Palestinians want peace and 53% agree that Israeli Jews want peace.

Trust/Zero-Sum Conflict: The most disturbing, but not surprising, finding relates to the question of trust. Among Palestinians a solid majority (86%) feel Israeli Jews are untrustworthy. On the Israeli Jewish side, a somewhat smaller majority (71%) also indicated that Palestinians cannot be trusted. Among Israeli Arabs, two-thirds (67%) indicated that Palestinians can be trusted. Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 51% of Israeli Jews, 48% of Israeli Arabs, and 68% of Palestinians agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization. As with various other questions in the survey, young Israeli Jews show higher levels of hardline thinking and distrust than other groups: among 18-34 year old Jews, 59% agree with the zero-sum statement, compared to 43% among Jews aged 35-54.

Fear: We asked Palestinians and Israeli Jews about fear of each other. Among Israeli Jews, 66% indicate they feel fear toward the Palestinians but among the Palestinians, only 43% indicate that they fear Israeli Jews. When asked about fear of Israeli soldiers and armed settlers 52% of Palestinians replied in the affirmative.   We also asked Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs about fear of each other: 48% of the Jews feel fear toward Israeli Arabs while 82% of Israeli Arabs do not feel fear toward Israeli Jews. Jews living as settlers in the West Bank are more fearful of both Palestinians and of Israeli Arabs, relative to Jews inside Israel – 72% of settlers are afraid of Palestinians, and 60% are afraid of Israeli Arabs.

General Conditions of the two sides: 54% of the Palestinians describe conditions in the Palestinian territories as bad or very bad while only 22% of Israeli Jews and 34% of Israeli Arabs describe conditions in Israel in general as bad or very bad.

          

(4) Values and Goals

Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve. Among Israeli Jews, Jewish majority is seen as the most important value (34%), followed by democracy (27%), peace (23%), and Greater Israel (14%). Among the Palestinians, Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital was seen as the most important value (46%), followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (30%), building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (13%) and building a democratic political system (11%).

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (63) - PRESS RELEASE On the 50th anniversary of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority believes that most of the Arab and European countries do not stand with the Palestinian people; but the overwhelming majority believes that God stands with the Palestinians and that the occupation will end soon or within five to ten years

 
8-11 March 2017

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8 and 11 March 2017. Internally, the period before the poll witnessed the setting of a May 2017 date for holding local elections and Hamas announced its intentions to boycott them. A novel by a Palestinian writer was banned by the PA and the license for the Palestinian Telecommunication Company was renewed without opening the market to competition. The Israeli government announced big plans for more settlement construction and the Palestinian president threatened to suspend security coordination in response to these announcements. Internationally, the Trump Administration took office in January. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, and reconciliation. It also covers the peace process and the 50th anniversary of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.
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Main Findings:
Findings of the first quarter of 2017 show a high level of dissatisfaction with the performance of President Abbas; in fact, two-thirds demand his resignation. Nonetheless, if new presidential elections take place today, he would receive the same level of support as that of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ candidate. Findings also show a decline in the level of support for Fatah compared to our findings three months ago when Fatah’s popularity rose a little in light of its successful holding of its 7th Convention.
On other domestic issues, the public is divided into two halves regarding the banning of a Palestinian novel which the PA claims to contain indecent language. Two-thirds disagree with the renewal of the license of the Palestinian Telecommunication Company (PALTEL) without the opening of the market to competition. We also found that a little over one fifth of the public goes to private, rather than governmental, hospitals because they think that the chances for a medical error in such hospitals are lower. A large minority indicates that they personally or a member of their family and friends had an experience involving a medical error.
On the 50th anniversary of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, more than half of the public is optimistic about its end soon or within the next five to ten years; but one third believes that it will last another 50 years. The public places the blame for the continuation of the occupation equally on its leadership and on the Palestinian factions and political parties, but it also places the responsibility on itself. A majority thinks the standing of Palestine today is worse than it was fifty years ago and also worse than it was ten years ago. But despite the belief of the public that most Arab and European countries do not stand with the Palestinian people, an overwhelming majority believes that God stands with the Palestinians.
Findings show a slight increase in the level of support for the two-state solution compared to our findings three months ago, but it is still just below the 50% mark. Strong correlation exists between the belief in the viability of the two-state solution and its support: the more viable the solution, the higher the support. Today, most Palestinians believe that the two-state solution is no longer viable due to settlement construction. Still, most Palestinians have not shifted to supporting the one-state solution; two-thirds continue to oppose it.
The overwhelming majority of the public is dissatisfied with the response of the Palestinian leadership to the new Israeli plans for settlement construction. In this context, a similarly large majority believes that Abbas is not serious about suspending security coordination with Israel. Abbas announced that if settlement construction continues, he would be forced to suspend security coordination. The public believes that the most suitable response to the new Israeli settlement plans should be the suspending of security coordination and the formal submission of a complaint against Israel to the International Criminal Court.


(1) 50th anniversary of Israeli occupation:
On the 50th anniversary of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the public is divided on the future directions: 32% believe the occupation will last for another 50 years, 24% believe it will end soon, and 29% believe it will end after five to ten years or more.
We asked the public to assess the strength of the role played by four different Palestinian actors in the struggle to end the Israeli occupation: (1) the Palestinian leadership, (2) most political parties and factions, (3) most of the public, and (4) the respondent himself or herself. Respondents were given three options to choose from: do their best, inadequate, and negligent role. Only 25% said the leadership is doing its best; 41% said its role is inadequate; and 32% said it is negligent. Similarly, 26% said most factions are doing their best; 49% said their role in inadequate; and 23% said they are negligent. On the other hand, 39% said the public is doing its best; 44% said its role is inadequate; and 16% said it is negligent. Finally, 29% assessed their own personal role as doing their best; 40% as inadequate; and 28% said they are negligent.
44% of the public believe that the standing of Palestine today is worse than it was 50 years ago. By contrast, 39% believe it is better than it was 50 years ago.
Moreover, 43% believe that the place or standing of Palestine today is worse than it was 10 years ago and 36% believe it is better than it was 10 years ago.
A large majority (72%) believes that the Netanyahu government does not take into consideration or attach importance to Palestinian reaction to its policies or actions while 26% believe it does take into consideration Palestinian reaction.
Two thirds (65%) of the public believe that most Arab counties do not stand often enough with the Palestinian people. A similar majority (66%) believes that most European countries do not stand most of the time with the Palestinian people. But 51% believe that most of the Muslim countries do stand most of the time with the Palestinian people and 56% believe that most of the peoples of the world do stand most of the time with the Palestinians.
On the other hand, an overwhelming majority of 94% believes that God stands with the Palestinian people.

(2) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

64% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 64% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 61% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip.
If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 33% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 20% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 7%; Khalid Mishal, Rami al Hamdallah and Mustapha Barghouti (5% each); Salam Fayyad 3%, and Saeb Erekat 2%.
Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36% and dissatisfaction at 61%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 41% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip.
If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 47% (compared to 49% three months ago) and the latter 47% (compared to 45% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 46% of the vote (compared to 45% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 50% (compared to 51% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 47% (compared to 45% three months ago) and Haniyeh 45% (compared to 47% three months ago).
If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 26%, Barghouti 40% and Haniyeh 33%. If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 36%.
If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 30% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 41%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 34% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 37% (compared to 40% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 36% (compared to 41% three months ago).

(3) Local elections:
Only 42% (41% in the West Bank and 42% in the Gaza Strip) say they will participate in the local elections which are scheduled to take place in May. 35% say they will not participate and 15% are not sure.
35% believe that the holding of local elections in May will serve the interests of reconciliation while 22% believe it will not serve it and 34% believe it will have no impact on it.
About half (49%) of the public believes that Hamas is making a mistake in its decision to boycott local elections while 31% believe it is not making a mistake.

(4) Domestic conditions: security, Gaza electricity, banned novel, PALTEL, medical errors, and others:
Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 11% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.
Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 38%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 50%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 47% and in the West Bank at 56%.
Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 46%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 23%. Three months ago 46% of Gazans and 24% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate.
In the West Bank, the largest percentage (44%) places responsibility for the electricity crisis in the Gaza Strip on Israel, 18% place it on the PA and president Abbas; only 13% place it on Hamas’ shoulders. By contrast, Gazans place the responsibility for the crisis on the PA and Hamas equally (31% on the PA and 30% on Hamas); only 20% place it on Israel.
We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Maan TV viewership is the highest, standing at 16%, followed by al Jazeera TV (at 15%), Palestine TV (at 14%), al Aqsa TV (at 13%), Filasteen al Youm (Palestine Today) at 12 %, Al Arabiya at 7%, and al Quds TV and al Mayadeen at 4% each.
Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77%.
Only 38% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear.
47% view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while 48% view it as an asset.
The public is almost evenly divided concerning the banning by the PA of a Palestinian novel charging that it contains indecent language: 46% approve the ban and 44% do not.
Two thirds do not agree with the PA decision to renew the license of the Palestinian Telecommunication Company (PALTEL) without a competitive bidding; only 24% agree with the PA decision.
38% say that they personally, or one of their family members or friends, had experienced a case of medical error and 61% say they did not. While 36% believe that such medical errors occur equally in private and governmental hospitals, 22% indicate that they go to private hospitals because they think errors are less likely in them and 23% indicate that despite the danger of medical errors they still go to governmental hospitals because of the cheaper costs.

(5) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:
Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 27% and pessimism at 67%. Three months ago optimism stood at 35% and pessimism at 61%.
26% say they are satisfied and 63% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 56%.
Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 18% (9% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) while 34% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 14% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

(6) New Israeli settlement plans and the peace process:
We asked the public about the most effective means of responding to the recent Israeli settlement plans: 25% think it is the suspension of security coordination with Israel; 24% think it is the submission of a formal complaint to the International Criminal Court; 19% think it is the resumption of armed attacks; 19% think it is a strong international condemnation of Israel, and 14% think it is the organization of popular non-violent protests.
An overwhelming majority of 77% are dissatisfied, and only 18% are satisfied, with Abbas’ response to the recent Israeli announcement of plans for 6,000 new settlement units. In fact, a large majority of 72% believes that President Abbas is not serious in his threat to suspend security coordination with Israel if settlement construction continues; only 21% believe he is serious.
On the two-state solution, the public is divided: 47% support and 51% oppose it. Three months ago, 44% supported it.
Palestinians are divided into three groups on the most effective means of building a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 34% believe that negotiation is the most effective; 37% think armed action is the most effective; and 24% think non-violent popular resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 34% said armed action is the most effective means.
A majority of 60% believes that the two-state solution is no longer viable due to settlement expansion while 37% believe that it is still viable.
A minority of 32% supports a one-state solution in which Jews and Arabs enjoy equal rights; 67% oppose the one-state solution. Three months ago, support for the one-state solution stood at 36%.
70% believe that the chances for creating an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel during the next five years are slim or non-existent while 29% believe the chances are medium or high.
The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 71%; 29% are not worried.
Furthermore, a majority of 52% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population and 32% believe that Israel wants to annex the West Bank while denying the Palestinians their rights. 14% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967.
50% believe that Israel intends to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 17% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places. Only 10% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.
In the absence of peace negotiations, 77% support joining more international organizations, 67% support non-violent popular resistance, 51% support a return to an armed intifada, and 49% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 53%.
Few months after the holding of the Paris peace conference, two thirds (67%) of the public believe that it did not contribute to improving the chances for Palestinian-Israeli peace; only 21% believe it did.
With Trump in the White House, 38% believe that the new American administration will aggravate Palestinian-Israeli tensions leading to escalation in popular and violent confrontations due to the expected settlement build-up; 33% believe conditions will remain as they are now; 11% believe the new administration will provoke diplomatic confrontation; only 9% believe it will lead to a renewal of the peace process.
If the Trump Administration called upon the two side to resume negotiations without any preconditions, a majority of 58% believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the call; only 31% believe it should accept it.

(7) The Arab World, ISIS:
76% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 23% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principal cause.
59% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 29% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.
An overwhelming majority of 92% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 4% believe it does represent true Islam. 4% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 5% (compared to 4% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam.
80% support and 16% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:
43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27% of the pubic; an identical percentage believes it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 24% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 4% say it is the absence of national unity.