The Underground Tunnel Omission: A Predictable Failure
As far back as 2008 I cautioned that the IDF is not doing enough to cope with the major threat posed by the subterranean system being constructed by Hamas: technology is not likely to provide a solution to this problem and even political beheadings will contribute nothing. Amir Rapaport's weekly column
Amir Rapaport | 21/10/2016
http://www.israeldefense.co.il
One of the most severe chronic diseases of the IDF is a particularly short corporate memory. Commanders in the various corps of the 'green' (ground) military change at a mind-boggling pace, and the knowledge accumulated during the tenure of a serving commander will fade away very often – or would have to be learned afresh, with more blood spilled as tuition fees. The results of this inbuilt failure become evident again and again, during every new major operation. Naturally, during peacetime, many of these faults remain hidden from public view.
The omission involving the underground tunnels in the Gaza Strip, which evolved into the most acute aspect of Operation Protective Edge, is a significant example of the implications of that chronic disease, and is the natural extension of other omissions from the more distant past. Against the background of this omission, some senior military officers and government officials are currently anxiously awaiting the forthcoming report by the State Comptroller, who has been investigating the information that was available about the tunnel threat and the solutions provided for that threat. The report is to be submitted very soon, and dozens of lawyers are already conducting a series of dialogs with the senior officials of the State Comptroller's office in an attempt to contain the damage to the respective reputations of their clients.
Additionally, last week the IDF Radio revealed, for the first time, findings of the IDF Commission of Inquiry headed by Brigadier-General Yossi Bachar, which investigated the issue pursuant to Operation Protective Edge. Amazingly, that commission of inquiry ruled that the IDF had not prepared properly to face the tunnel threat.
The tremendous efforts currently under way are an utter waste of time. Here are some simple and alternative findings that were listed in a report regarding this omission which I had written long before Operation Protective Edge. The following was published on the NRG website on October 25, 2008, under the heading 'The Surprises Awaiting IDF under the Ground in the Gaza Strip'.
This is what I had written back then: "A construction effort is currently under way in the Gaza Strip. Admittedly, it cannot be seen, but it is gaining momentum nevertheless. We can tell just by the massive demand for cement, as on the ground you cannot see where all this cement is going. Throughout the Gaza Strip there are hardly any construction sites where high-rise buildings are being erected, and even the number of low-rise buildings currently under construction is very small. This gap can lead to only one conclusion: he who does not build high – builds deep. Most of the construction work currently under way is being carried out clandestinely, under the ground.
"What are they building down there? Ask the Hezbollah terrorists who invented the 'nature reserves' in Lebanon – those hidden, impenetrable firing positions that changed the rules so dramatically in the summer of 2006. That is the process currently taking place throughout the Gaza Strip – massive underground systems, bunkers, basements and mainly an infinite web of tunnels and fighting trenches.
"If the ceasefire agreement should collapse and IDF invade the Gaza Strip, those tunnels will be manned by thousands of terrorists who would attempt to inflict heavy casualties on the invading forces."
I also pointed out that "Military sources estimate that Hamas are building tunnels for two primary needs – offensive and defensive operations. The tunnels are being constructed under the central parts of such cities as Rafah or even Gaza, where, according to Hamas' estimates, extensive combat encounters could take place when IDF invade the Gaza Strip.
"The tunnels inside the cities were intended to enable Hamas terrorists to move freely from street to street under the ground, in order to take the IDF units by surprise – from a different position every time. The fighting trenches connect to underground command and control bunkers as well as to underground ammunition dumps.
"At the same time, tunnels are being constructed away from the city centers that connect to 'explosive pits' – cavernous spaces in the ground, located under the primary routes leading into the Gaza Strip, which Hamas might fill with explosives so that they may be detonated, when the time comes, under IDF vehicle convoys.
"The underground construction effort also includes, according to various estimates, hundreds of firing positions for Qassam and Katyusha rockets, designed to be immune to Israeli air strikes. Some positions of this type have already been uncovered during a limited-scope IDF operation in the northern part of the Gaza Strip about ten months ago. The overriding principle of this project is the fact that the entire underground construction activity is carried out while existing buildings are being converted for combat functions above the ground, too, so that everything may be coordinated efficiently.
"Sooner or later, as history has taught us, it is the nature of war to shift into the subterranean medium, mainly in the case of confrontations between regular armed forces and guerrilla groups."
I had also written the following back then: "Hamas is probably counting on its members to inflict massive casualties on IDF owing to the fact that they will be fighting out of those tunnels. In view of those heavy casualties, Hamas expects the (Israeli) political echelon to come under pressure to withdraw the forces, as the fighting would seem futile.
"At the tactical level, it is doubtful whether IDF can come up with an effective solution for coping with the web of tunnels being built by Hamas (…). When Hamas' plans seem so obvious, the question that needs to be asked is 'What are IDF doing about it?' Apparently, they are not doing enough."
I had concluded with the following remarks: "In view of the fact that 'an underground city' is currently being built in the Gaza Strip, one could have expected a tremendous effort by the best minds of the Israeli defense establishment, but that does not seem to be the case.
"'Sometimes it seems that the tunnel problem does not really concern anyone, as if it were the problem of some other country,' says a senior defense source with frustration, 'If we have to pay a heavy toll because of the fact that we are not investing every possible effort, people will say it was an omission. At this time, it looks like a severe omission, one which we can point out in advance'."
The Alternative Report
The obvious conclusion from the report published in 2008 is that all of the details regarding the tunnel system and its objectives were well known. Since then, the information only became more detailed and comprehensive, and even included the precise locations of some of the tunnels, as the data about those tunnels had been obtained by the defense establishment through an extensive range of intelligence sources.
What became of that information within IDF after 2008? Not much. The few commanders who were truly concerned about this danger were replaced by others. Some of them were discharged to civilian life at a fairly young age. The new commanders were kept busy, in the best IDF tradition, by more immediate, local threats – not by what had been conceived as a distant threat that would eventually become the problem of 'another watch'.
On the morning when Operation Protective Edge was initiated, the IDF Chief of Staff placed in motion an operational plan that had no connection whatsoever to fighting the tunnels. That entire issue had been kept out of the plan. The IDF Operations Division referred to the employment of additional element that were to be dispatched to the combat zone in the event of an actual enemy intrusion – nothing more than that.
The enormity and severity of the threat had been well known for a few years, but the IDF failed to internalize and understand it, and the memory was eroded. Consequently, IDF regarded the tunnels on the first morning of the fighting as a marginal issue – if they had ever addressed them to begin with – and all of that does not even refer to the argument between ISA and IDF as to whether a 'tunnel warning' had existed or not. Beyond that, there was no similarity between the manner in which the actual combat operations were conducted and the original battle plan.
Only IDF Southern Command had a plan for fighting the tunnels, designated 'Hagana Kidmit' (= Forward Defense). It focused on a section extending to a depth of several kilometers inside the Gaza Strip. The general commanding IDF Southern Command in those days, Major-General Sammy Turjeman, suggested it to the cabinet for the first time only five days after the operation had started.
The IDF Intelligence Directorate knew almost everything, but failed in presenting the over-all picture of the threat to the senior echelons of the military and the government. When Operation Protective Edge was launched, the IDF Intelligence Directorate was busy, first and foremost, disseminating thousands of bits of intelligence information to the field echelon – an important and worthy lesson drawn from the Second Lebanon War. The underground tunnels had not been defined as a high-priority threat.
The line of defense of the IDF Intelligence Directorate vis-à-vis the State Comptroller maintains that the tunnel issue was the exclusive intelligence responsibility of IDF Southern Command, as GHQ only handles strategic-level threats. Allegedly, IDF Southern Command had refused to hand over the authority to the IDF Intelligence Directorate (at GHQ), and only agreed to hand over the tasks of locating and tracking the long-range missiles, regarded as a strategic threat. Even the task of handling (intelligence-wise) the enemy's short-range rockets remained the responsibility of IDF Southern Command Intelligence.
At the operational level, between 2008 and 2014 IDF had made almost no preparations whatsoever for coping with the tunnel threat. The combat effort against the tunnels during Operation Protective Edge was nothing more than a makeshift, improvised activity. It is hard to believe, but back then IDF did not have any structured drills for engaging in combat operations inside the tunnels. Incidentally, since then IDF are constantly developing such drills and preparing for it using a specialized tunnel training facility.
Until Operation Protective Edge, the lion's share of the effort aimed against the tunnel threat was technological. The substantial efforts notwithstanding, dozens of projects intended to eliminate the enemy's underground system failed miserably. In 2011, MAFAT (IMOD's Weapon System & Technological Infrastructure Research & Development Administration) announced an emergency project. In 2012, a subsequent tender was issued for that project. The technology of the winning project was based, in part, on an idea conceived years previously by the late former President of Israel, Shimon Peres. That project failed on the ground. Even after Operation Protective Edge, when the technological effort was pushed to the limit, technology has failed to provide any magic solutions.
History Now
Against the background of the concerns regarding the forthcoming State Comptroller's report, the decision to start erecting an underground concrete wall between Israel and the Gaza Strip, which was made recently without an in-depth deliberation and even without a tender, may be viewed as nearly hysterical. Even if the limited-scale trial currently under way succeeds, the project as a whole seems to be an illogical idea: the cost of constructing a 60 kilometer long wall of this type could amount to hundreds of billions of ILS. The actual construction process will take many years to complete, and when everything has been done – the enemy may still penetrate the wall and cross it using mechanical equipment. Meanwhile, this enormous project is under way, and everyone's attention is drawn to the forthcoming State Comptroller's report.
Past experience has shown that the State Comptroller's report will point to specific individuals as those responsible for the omission more than others. If the State Comptroller fails to do so, the media will look for "beheadings". The names of former IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Benny Gantz (currently a civilian) and former Head of the IDF Intelligence Directorate Major-General Aviv Kochavi (who currently commands IDF Northern Command) have already been mentioned by the media in this context – as in the case of the article by Amos Harel published by the newspaper Ha'Aretz last week. Naturally, the question of what the defense cabinet had known or had not known will erupt with unabated intensity, and a fierce political debate regarding this issue would follow.
Focusing on the personal guilt of individuals will, naturally, be a mistake – just like the mistake made by the Agranat Commission after the Yom-Kippur War. An enlightening study by Professor Alex Mintz of IDC Hertzliya, dealing with this particular matter, has been published last month. Additionally, the problem of the cabinet's wartime performance and the faulty interface between the cabinet and the military echelon is much more profound than the question that is likely to be raised again in this context – "What did the government ministers knew about the tunnel threat?"
The failure is systemic and the chronic disease known as the short corporate memory of IDF will continue to exact heavy tolls in future operations as well. Even if this is difficult to prove in retrospect, it is perfectly obvious from the things that had been written well in advance. __
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