Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 14, 2017

#OyVeyDonaldTrumps Threefold Challange Against Iran

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The Trump administration has commenced with a tempest of policy implementation of promises made during the election campaign in areas of policy such as immigration, trade, health care, the Supreme Court, and many others. They mostly related to domestic policy and the American economy. Regarding the Middle East, the administration has adopted a different style of rhetoric from that of the previous administration. Nevertheless, there is no strong evidence for a new regional policy: whether in relation to Iran and the nuclear deal, the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria, or the issue of intensifying the war against ISIS and all forms of radical Islam. When shaping its Middle East policy in general and its policy on Iran in particular, the new administration will need to come to terms with major tensions within its policy targets—declared and undeclared—vis-à-vis Iran (regarding nuclear issues, regional influence, terror and subversion, long-range missile development, cyber warfare, and soft power) and other rivals (ISIS, Russia, China, North Korea). All of this must be dealt with under the guiding principle of “America first.”
The Trump administration has commenced with a tempest of policy implementation of promises made during the election campaign in areas of policy such as immigration, trade, health care, the Supreme Court, and many others. They mostly related to domestic policy and the American economy. Regarding the Middle East, the administration has adopted a different style of rhetoric from that of the previous administration. Nevertheless, there is no strong evidence for a new regional policy: whether in relation to Iran and the nuclear deal, the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria, or the issue of intensifying the war against ISIS and all forms of radical Islam. When shaping its Middle East policy in general and its policy on Iran in particular, the new administration will need to come to terms with major tensions within its policy targets—declared and undeclared—vis-à-vis Iran (regarding nuclear issues, regional influence, terror and subversion, long-range missile development, cyber warfare, and soft power) and other rivals (ISIS, Russia, China, North Korea). All of this must be dealt with under the guiding principle of “America first.”
This article expounds upon the proposed American policy vis-à-vis Iran, and the inputs that Israel can contribute to shaping this policy.

Where does Iran Challenge the United States?

US National Security Adviser Mike Flynn speaks during the daily press briefing at the White House in Washington, DC, on February 1, 2017. NICHOLAS KAMM / AFP
The first front on which Iran challenges the new American administration is that of the nuclear agreement. In response to Trump’s call during the campaign to reopen the July 2015 agreement between Iran and the P5+1, Iran declared that it is unwilling to do so. Recently, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran even stated that it intends to input enriched material into advanced centrifuges (IR-8), in order to advance the research and development program of centrifuges that are more efficient than those currently used in Iran. The Iranian goals are to develop its technological ability to enrich uranium, to quickly amass fissile material, to reduce the size of installations required for future industrialized enrichment, and to make it easier to hide enrichment facilities should it choose to do so. This is not a blatant violation of the nuclear agreement, but rather “gray area” activity that depends on one’s interpretation of the agreement. Iran is attempting to force its interpretation, which naturally is more permissive than the American interpretation, and is testing American resolve to enforce the agreement in accordance with its own interpretation.
The second front pitting the Trump administration against Tehran appeared in the headlines this month thanks to a failed Iranian test of a North Korean-model ballistic missile, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead some 4000 kilometers. Although the United States and Germany declared that the test launch violated UN Security Council resolution 2231, this resolution does not unequivocally prohibit Iran from performing such a test, but “calls” for it not to carry out tests of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weaponry. Just as with the nuclear issue, Iran is not violating the resolution, but challenging it in practice and testing American willingness to respond. Furthermore, it has been reported that Iran tested a cruise missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. This action also does not violate the Security Council resolution, which does not relate to cruise missiles, but only ballistic missile tests.
The third front where Washington faces Tehran is in the non-nuclear realm. Iran works to expand its regional power against its main enemies—Israel and Saudi Arabia—by establishing militias and military proxies, as well as by providing Iranian weaponry and support to terror organizations. Against Israel, Tehran continues to support Hezbollah and supply it with advanced weapons, with the aim of enhancing its ability to threaten Israel. Iran also solidifies its power in Syria and Lebanon, including through ethnic cleansing of Sunni areas and settlement of Shiite populations in their stead, creating zones of Iranian influence. This is all undertaken while strengthening the alliance with Assad and Hezbollah.
Iran supports the Houthi rebel organizations fighting US allies in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Iran deals in subversion, destabilization, and terror among Shiite populations in the Gulf states, with a focus on northeastern Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. In the last few months, the conflict has even spread from land to sea: reports were published this week that Houthi forces attacked a Saudi ship in the Red Sea, killing two seamen. This follows the October 2016 attack by Houthi forces on a UAE ship, and the unsuccessful attempt to attack an American destroyer with Iranian surface-to-ship missiles. Generally, these attacks have been directed against US allies, not against American forces. On this front, too, Iran does not directly defy Washington, but aids the fight against its allies in an attempt to undermine the strength of the American-Sunni alliance in the Middle East.
From Iran’s perspective, this is merely a continuation of the cautious strategy of “testing boundaries” that was applied against the previous American administration. The Obama administration was determined to reach a deal with Iran regarding its nuclear program. For this purpose, it was willing to compromise on American interests and the interests of American allies while avoiding a significant escalation with Iran that could have endangered the administration’s diplomatic achievement in the nuclear issue. The assumption of the previous administration was that the alternative to an agreement was regional war, and that an agreement should be reached, even a non-optimal one, which should then be diligently implied.
Furthermore, it appears that Iran’s own self confidence has grown stronger due to Russian support and the increased cooperation between Tehran and Moscow since the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Russia took advantage of the American passivity in Iraq and Syria in order to reassert its hold over the Middle East, finding a partner for this in Iran. Although this is not a strategic alliance, and there is mutual suspicion between Iran and Russia, both have made sure to successfully coordinate their actions in Syria, and to promote further common interests in preserving the Assad regime, expanding the supply of advanced Russian weaponry to Iran, and collaborating in the field of civil nuclear power.

American Resolve is required
In response to the ballistic missile test conducted by Iran, the Trump administration announced sanctions against Iranian organizations and persons connected with terror activities and the Iranian missile program. In addition, an American battleship was sent to the Bab el-Mandeb region to secure trade routes against Houthi rebels in Yemen, who are supported by Tehran. The objective of the American response, as stated by President Trump, was to refuse to show restraint in the face of problematic Iranian conduct and to deter the Iranian regime from continuing its wayward regional policy. Nevertheless, the statement by Defense Secretary James Mattis that he is not considering to increase American forces in the region shows that the new administration has yet to fully formulate a strategy that will significantly change the strategic reality vis-à-vis Iran as shaped by the Obama administration. Thus, the challenge facing the new American administration is, on the one hand, to block Iran on all the fronts where it is challenging the United States, while on the other hand to avoid escalation at an undesirable time.
The change in American rhetoric—as expressed in the statement of General Michael Flynn that Iran is “on notice,” and as reinforced by President Trump’s statement that Iran is “playing with fire”—was necessary to make clear to Iran that the rules of the game have changed. But words must be backed up by equivalent deeds that display the same level of force. The Trump administration should restore the credibility of American policies and declarations in order to deter Iran from taking negative policy steps, while strengthening Middle East stability and protecting the interests of the United States and its allies in the region.
In order to formulate a different policy on Iran, the Trump administration must confirm the following basic assumptions: a) rejection of the Obama administration’s assumption that there is no alternative to an agreement; this assumption paralyzed the previous administration. The new administration should start with an assumption that the alternative to an agreement is not necessarily war; b) the alternative to the existing agreement, should Iran pull out of it, is the restoration of significant sanctions and a credible military option. If Iran should move to nuclear breakout, the response should be a surgical military strike only against nuclear facilities and containment of the incident. Against a strong and determined administration, the possibility of escalation should scare Iran rather than the United States.
Based upon these decisions, it would be appropriate to define a strategy for two main time frames: the short-medium term, and the long term. In the short and medium terms, the Trump administration should work with other world powers to form a consensus regarding which actions by Iran would be considered a violation of the nuclear agreement. Even without Russian or Chinese agreement, the United States and its European allies should agree on interpretation and coordinate a response for the “gray area” violations. It should be clear that the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany are committed to the agreement solely in accordance with a strict interpretation.
In parallel, Washington should push for a new Security Council resolution to replace Resolution 2231, which would unequivocally prohibit the test of Iranian ballistic and cruise missiles that can carry a nuclear warhead. Such actions would demonstrate—to both Iran and other world powers—American resolve to create new rules of the game.
Russia is a key country for implementation of this strategy. President Trump has stated that he intends to act in coordination with Russian president Vladimir Putin. In a future agreement between these leaders, it is essential to include a demand to weaken Iran’s hold in Syria, with a focus on Iranian deployment in southern Syria and the Golan Heights. Another important issue is the cessation of the supply of advanced Russian weaponry to Assad, and from him to Hezbollah rendering a direct threat against Israel.
Furthermore, the American administration should increase pressure on Iran’s alliances and relationships with terror organizations in the region, using counterterrorism and deterrence. This policy should include a joint intelligence effort of the United States and its regional allies, as well as Israel, along with the employment of targeted force aimed at stopping Iranian weapon deliveries by sea and air. Also in this arena, an aggressive policy against Iran’s system of alliances, and injury to the Quds Force, is necessary so that Tehran will understand that the Trump administration intends to deal with Iran and take risks not taken in the past by the United States.
The Trump administration seeks to make clear that it is not willing to permit provocative Iranian actions, but it is important to avoid uncontrolled escalation during the years when Iran is far from the nuclear threshold. The suggested strategy demonstrates that there is an alternative to an agreement, which will further regional stability while not lead to a regional war. For this purpose, it is important to avoid tactical and local responses, and to formulate a comprehensive strategy intended to weaken Iran.
Regarding the long-term, the American strategy should include preparatory plans with the aim of preserving the credibility of the American threat, even after some of the main restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program are removed, beginning at the end of the seventh year of the agreement. A major component of the strategy must be amending the agreement, which currently allows in the long term for Iran to become the legitimate, unrestricted owner of nuclear infrastructure. For this purpose, the US administration must create, together with its allies, deterrent and punishment mechanisms that will deter Iran from developing its nuclear program and approaching the nuclear threshold, and being a mere few months or weeks from a bomb. The enforcement mechanisms should also include the possibility—coordinated with the world powers that signed the agreement—of restoring a significant sanctions regime, which in the past led Iran to the negotiating table and to compromise.
The US administration should be ready for Iran to decide to withdraw from the agreement, or in the future to exploit the removal of restrictions as prescribed by the agreement and advance to nuclear weapons. Then, the ability to harm the Iranian economy’s financial and energy sectors and a credible threat of focused military force as a last resort to prevent a nuclear Iran will be a key to deter Iran. These deterrent mechanisms might be the only tools capable of preventing a nuclear Iran while also avoiding a large-scale regional military conflict.

The Israeli Input
For Israel, too, words must lead to deeds. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has declared that he intends to make the Iranian issue the main priority in the talks he will be holding with President Trump. Iran and its proxies, especially Hezbollah, are the greatest strategic threat currently facing Israel. Since summer 2015 we have been recommending an American-Israeli “parallel agreement” for coping with the consequences of the JCPOA and Iran’s malignant activities. Today there is an additional Israeli interest in establishing a strong regional front under American leadership against the extensive Iranian activities in the region. Formation of such a front would be a crucial and meaningful achievement for the stability of the Middle East and containment of Iran.
The formation of this type of regional anti-Iranian alliance may obligate Israel to make significant adjustments in the Palestinian issue. If President Trump would be willing to pursue bilateral agreements with his allies and perhaps even work towards convening a regional coalition with the participation of the United States, the Sunni Gulf states, and Israel, it is imperative that the Israeli government initiate moves that would not foil these efforts. This would be the optimal way to advance the most important Israeli interests in the long term against Iran while advancing an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. 

Monday, February 13, 2017

Walk of Shame: Sweden's "first feminist government in the world" don Hijabs for Iran's President Rouhani






In a statement that has gone viral on Twitter and Facebook, UN Watch expressed disappointment that Sweden's self-described "first feminist government in the world" sacrificed its principles and betrayed the rights of Iranian women as trade minister Ann Linde led other female members in walking before Iranian President Rouhani on Saturday covered in Hijabs, Chadors, and long coats, in deference to Iran's oppressive, discriminatory and unjust modesty laws which make the Hijabcompulsory — despite the Swedish government's promise to promote "a gender equality perspective" internationally, and to adopt a "feminist foreign policy" in which "equality between women and men is a fundamental aim."

In doing so, Sweden's female leaders ignored the appeal by Iranian women's right activist Masih Alinejad who urged European female politicians "to stand for their own dignity" and to refuse to kowtow to the compulsory and discriminatory Hijab law while visiting Iran.

Alinrejad created a Facebook page for Iranian women to show pictures of their uncovered hair as an act of resistance, a page which now numbers 1 million followers.

"European female politicians are hypocrites," says Alinejad. "They stand with French Muslim women and condemn the Burkini ban—because they think compulsion is bad—but when it happens to Iran, they just care about money."

The scene in Tehran on Saturday was also a sharp contrast to Deputy Prime Minister Isabella Lövin's feminist stance against U.S. President Donald Trump, in a viral tweet and then in a Guardian op-ed last week, in which she wrote that "the world need strong leadership for women’s rights."

Trade Minister Linde, who signed multiple agreements with Iranian ministers while wearing a veil, "sees no conflict" between her government's human rights policy and signing trade deals with an oppressive dictatorship that tortures prisoners, persecutes gays, and is a leading executioner of minors.

If Sweden really cares about human rights, they should not be empowering a regime that brutalizes its own citizens while carrying out genocide in Syria; and if they care about women's rights, then the female—and male—ministers never should never have gone to misogynistic Iran in the first place.

The Swedish government has now come under sharp criticism from centrist and left-wing Swedish lawmakers, who said the ministers should not have deferred to "gender apartheid."






"They go to my country," said Aliinejad recently in the European Parliament, "and they ignore millions of those women who send their photos to me and put themselves in danger to be heard. And the European politicians keep their smile, wearing the Hijab, and saying this is a 'cultural issue'—which is wrong."

Below: Sweden's trade minister Ann Linde—in charge of her country's "feminist foreign policy"—wears the compulsory Hijab, and, voluntarily, a long black coat akin to the Chador.








Meanwhile: 23-year-old U.S. Women's Chess Champion Refused to Play This Week in Iran
By contrast, U.S. women's chess champion Nazi Paikidze refused to play in this week's women's world championship, because it is being held in Iran.

“By participating, I would be forced to submit to forms of oppression designed specifically for women,” says the Las Vegas-based Paikidze, 23.

Paikidze was even wiling to sacrifice her dreams. “I would rather not be a world champion,” she says. “Human rights stand above chess and everything else.”
Paikidze currently is a full-time chess professional. She married American engineer Greg Barnes and resides in the area of Las Vegas, Nevada, United States.[32] Paikidze's Georgian first name, Nazí (ნაზი) translates as "gentle". She has explained that the correct pronunciation is "nah-ZEE". She was named after her grandmother.[33] Paikidze studied at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC), which has a chess program that has won a record number of times both the Pan-American Intercollegiate Team Chess Championship and the President’s Cup. She joined the UMBC team in the fall of 2012....... wikipedia











Sunday, February 5, 2017

Time to Make Decisions in the Middle East and Zion, #OyVeyDonald Trump, Strategic Balance, Palestinian -Israeli Conflict, Intervention in Syria,New Security Doctrine, IDF Bashing and Morality Challanges


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The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) recently held its annual conference, which was attended by statesmen, military commanders, media figures, and political and security experts from Israel and abroad. As true of any conference of this type, many divergent opinions were expressed on a range of topics. They sketched a complex picture of Israel’s current situation and the challenges it can expect to face in 2017. Based on the mosaic of opinions presented at the conference, several distinct, unambiguous trends characterizing this moment in time did emerge from the event.

Strategic Balance

Israel’s overall strategic balance is positive. Israel is viewed as a regional power with undeniable military superiority over its rivals and enemies. Its regional situation is stable, mostly due to the weakening of its rivals by many years of internal wars in the Arab world. The ongoing bloodbaths in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen are not expected to end any time soon. The power struggle for regional hegemony between Iran, Turkey, and the Sunni states led by Saudi Arabia is a destabilizing factor and leaves little hope for sustainable mitigation of the region’s religious, ethnic, and national enmity. Nonetheless, in the internal and international arenas, Israel’s situation is deteriorating, a fact upon which we focus below.

Ramifications of Donald Trump’s Presidency
Trump’s presidency was the major change affecting the conference, coloring virtually every discussion, including those debating the risks, but even more so when “Trumpportunities” were identified, especially from the perspective of Russia and right-wing parties in Israel.

The dramatic shifts in the West, primarily Trump’s election to the US presidency and the United Kingdom’s decision—based on a popular referendum—to withdraw from the European Union (Brexit), have shaken up the international community’s agenda. These shifts are a direct consequence of deep subterranean processes that have taken place over the last decade. They reflect an isolationist desire on the part of western societies and are manifested by the rise of the nationalistic right at an unprecedented scope since the end of World War II. According to Professor Shlomo Avineri, there are four main reasons for this: the exclusion of large segments of the population from the political elite; the great economic crisis of 2008; the influence of social media; and the after-effects of large-scale waves of immigration. These have created a social class that feels endangered and therefore rejects the existing liberal democratic order. The isolationist, anti-globalization tendency opened a door to forces competing with the West in the international system. The first is Russia, whose military intervention in Ukraine and later in Syria has restored some of the international prestige it had lost when the Cold War ended. The other is China, which is extending its influence over vast regions—including the Middle East and Africa—through its economic policy.

The new Trump administration provides Israel with an opportunity to ensure the stability and strength of its strategic relations with the United States, its most important and loyal ally, as well as continued American support for Israel in every field, especially security. When the presidential election results were announced, the cheers in Jerusalem indicated hope for the start of a new era. But it is imperative that Israel’s leadership does not rush to identify with everything that Trump represents. Trump’s worldview, as presented during the election campaign, encompasses some highly problematic aspects in terms of universal values that Israel must not identify with or adopt, because doing so might come back to haunt Israel in the future. The more that Israel identifies with Trump’s policies, the more it is liable to become the weakest link, targeted by members of the international community who are opposed to Trump and his directives. Furthermore, a blatant cold shoulder to the American Jewish community, the majority who supports the Democratic Party, is short-sighted and can harm Israel in the long-run. Israel must return to being a bipartisan issue, receiving support from both sides of the political aisle.

The Need to Focus on Healing the Rifts
Given the diminishing external threats, Israel’s internal challenges now dominate the public agenda, with the relations between the military and society being a prominent issue. This is not a new phenomenon, however; since its inception, the IDF—being “the people’s army”—and its relations with the people have always been part of the public discourse. But it seems as if in the past year, the tune has changed. In addition to incidents that highlighted the relationship between religion and the military, the most impactful, talked-about event was Elor Azaria’s shooting of the disarmed terrorist in Hebron. The fundamental issue was the hotly debated question of the IDF’s morality and its fighting norms, but the incident also exposed essential differences of opinion on the army’s conduct, the representative institutions of democracy, and the public’s trust in the system. The irresponsible conduct of some officials, motivated by political considerations, severely damaged the status of the state’s judiciary and the public’s trust in the IDF. In this case, the public was subjected to manipulation of the meaning and the boundaries of “security,” which is open to many interpretations, but was used here for political ends that undermine the democratic foundations of the state.
Another issue in the internal arena is the position of the Arab public within the state. Politicians, both Arab and Jewish, have deepened the Jewish-Arab rift and have harmed the relations formed since the creation of the state. Civil society representatives from the Arab sector have asked to end the practice of testing their loyalty; they wholeheartedly identify as Israeli citizens and ask for equality of rights and opportunities. President Reuven (Ruvi) Rivlin’s statement at the conference that the government should make regularizing construction in Israel’s Bedouin settlements and Arab cities its top priority resonated especially with this issue.

The Time to Present a Plan on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

As was made clear by all the speakers, as well as by a comprehensive survey the INSS carried out in preparation for the conference, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies at the core of Israel’s challenges at every level. The political stalemate and occasional outbursts of violence since October 2015 have led to despair on both sides, and neither has a plan of action that inspires hope for relations between the two peoples in the future. Trump’s inauguration was encouraging because of statements he made both before and after moving into the White House. His unconditional support for Israel creates a new situation in which there is no longer any “bad cop” in Washington who will curb Israeli policy. In such a state of affairs, Israel has a golden opportunity to stop being ambiguous and present a clear policy on the conflict, but there is also a risk that Israel might take rash and irreversible steps.

Israeli politicians have firmly grasped this realization and have tried to propose ideas to improve Israel’s situation. Education Minister Naftali Bennett presented his vision of annexing Areas C and instituting Palestinian autonomy in Areas A and B. His colleague, Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked, complemented the proposal by presenting practical steps: moving the embassies of the United States and other nations to Jerusalem, annexing Ma’aleh Adumim and the Etzion Bloc, and undertaking massive construction in the West Bank. Neither was a plan; rather they were merely ideas, because no references were made or considerations given to the many security, political, and moral ramifications of closing off the option of reaching arrangements with the Palestinians as well as its effect on Israel’s international standing. From the other side of the Israeli political map, Yitzhak Herzog and Tzipi Livni, the leaders of the Zionist Camp, presented their vision of two states for two peoples. Herzog listed the steps needed: separating from the Palestinians; instituting a ten-year agreement of non-violence in the area between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River during which a dialogue between the two peoples would be launched to create trust and to develop a foundation for cooperation; accelerating Palestinian economic development; and ending support for terrorism and incitement in the Palestinian Authority. At the end of the ten-year period, it would be possible to discuss a permanent status agreement. This vision, too, is only partial, and is not cohesive enough to serve as a practicable plan of action.

A component shared by all the proposals was the need to improve the Palestinian economy. It seems that there is wide agreement on its importance in stabilizing Israeli-Palestinian relations. This is especially true for the Gaza Strip, which requires serious humanitarian assistance and infrastructural improvement. An interesting component is the plan to build a seaport on an artificial offshore island, as proposed by Transportation and Intelligence Minister Israel Katz. Even greater consensus exists about the opportunity for cooperation with the so-called pragmatic Sunni Arab states. The call to expand cooperation with them already has become commonplace, even trite, and is based on a combination of two basic assumptions: first, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which in the past topped the agenda of many states, has become less important than it was previously and no longer hinders official relations; and second, Israel and the Arab states have many shared interests, from stopping Iran’s influence in the Middle East and defeating ISIS, to issues relating to the economy, infrastructure, and resources. Minister Katz even presented the plan “Trains to the East” as a commercial transportation platform to promote such an agenda. There is nothing wrong with trying to forge closer relations with the Arab states, and Israel’s security relations with Egypt and Jordan have only strengthened the recognition of the positive potential of peace treaties. But Israel’s assumption that there is readiness for establishing open official relations in the absence of progress on the Palestinian political process is not factually grounded and ignores public opinion in the Arab states where the mention of Israel is still a red flag.

In the broader sense, Israel is now experiencing an international intifada, as US General (ret.) David Petraeus put it. A wide range of players are operating against Israel, with only a minority that is anti-Semitic and denies the legitimacy of Israel’s very existence (especially under the banner of the BDS movement), with the majority whose opposition is motivated by Israel’s policy on the Palestinians. UN Security Council Resolution 2334 of December 2016 is an illustrative example. In the eyes of the world, the policy on construction in the West Bank Jewish settlements is a test of Israel’s real intentions: does it want a political resolution based on the two-state solution or not? At the end of the day, Israel’s unwillingness to end its rule over another people in the West Bank and its steps jettisoning the two-state solution, for all intents and purposes, are liable to result in Israel’s political isolation and in danger of being subjected to boycotts and sanctions. The establishment and operation of systems to fight delegitimization can help Israel’s standing here and there, but cannot make a substantial difference. Being willing to make progress in measures that aim for arrangements with the Palestinians, including real steps on the ground, is the best thing Israel can do for itself.

The Question of the Validity of the Non-Intervention Strategy in Syria
Since the beginning of the civil war and the direct involvement of proxies and foreign powers in Syria, Israel has opted for a strategy of non-intervention, unless there is an imminent threat to Israel. Russia’s military intervention, which has become a key factor in shaping Syria’s future, and the growing strength of the pro-Assad coalition—led by Russia and joined by Iran, Hezbollah, and thousands of other Shiite militia fighters—have gained momentum since the victory in Aleppo, with the scales tilted in favor of Assad in the overall balance of power. Eventually, the battles will spread to southern Syria and the Syrian Golan Heights, which is liable to affect Israel directly and increase the chances of escalation vis-à-vis Iran and its proxies—especially Hezbollah—including the Lebanese arena. This analysis indicates that in preparation for such an eventuality, Israel must work more closely with Jordan to establish a joint area of influence in southern Syria and to continue shaping a reality convenient for Israel along the Syrian border by providing civilian and humanitarian assistance to the local communities on the condition that they prevent terrorist activity from their territory.

In Syria, too, much depends on Trump’s policy. Based on what we currently know, it seems he will prefer to focus on defeating ISIS, as his predecessor did, and leave the overall solution to Russia. The shift in the balance between the two major international powers in the Middle East and in general was evident at the Astana Conference, which was led by the Russians and was the first time since World War II that the United States was not a central player in an international process to determine a new world order.

From Israel’s point of view, this is very worrisome, which is why Israel must take prompt, intensive action with the United States to ensure that in any future arrangement in Syria, Iran will not be part of the solution, and neither Iran nor Hezbollah will be allowed a presence in Syria in general and in the Golan Heights in particular. The Israeli effort vis-à-vis Iran must be part of the overall policy on the Iranian regional subversion and its ambition to achieve nuclear capabilities. President Trump has declared his desire to reconsider the July 2015 nuclear deal signed with Iran, although it is hard to tell how serious he is. It is unlikely that a unilateral revocation would serve the best interests of the United States and its allies, including Israel. Either way, Israel must build a joint plan with the United States to combat Iran on two levels. The first and more immediate one is preventing Iranian expansion and subversion in the Middle East. The second is intelligence and operational preparation for the time when the limitations of the nuclear agreement will end and Iran will be free to acquire military nuclear capabilities.

Formulating a Security Doctrine to Meet Current and Future Challenges
Israel must formulate a doctrine to confront the range of challenges presented at the conference, and it must articulate its political and security goals for the future. Based on the topics discussed, several positive points can be discerned about Israel’s strength and military superiority. The IDF’s air force has taken a significant qualitative leap by acquiring the Adir planes (F-35) while also developing advanced capabilities in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles and multi-layer aerial defense systems. An Israeli cyber system was constructed, and is at the forefront of Israeli innovation. The field of cyber demonstrates how it is possible to take a vision and an existing civilian infrastructure and turn them into a powerful tool (of both soft and hard power) to serve the country’s national security. Furthermore, the IDF’s current multiyear plan, the Gideon plan, demonstrates that the IDF is adjusting to a changing world and can adapt both to external processes and internal processes within Israeli society. On the other hand, like the IDF strategy document of August 2015, it also highlights the fact that military plans are not enough and that the absence of a political vision and goals is sorely felt. Currently, the security establishment is operating without a long-term strategic or political direction, and must engage in planning processes based on its own definitions so that the military echelon will be well prepared for the challenges of the future.

 It’s Time to Make Decisions
As 2017 gets under way, Israel is facing more questions than answers. Some are rooted in the uncertainty relating to the new US administration and the implications of that change for Israel’s strategic environment, but many are linked to the Israeli penchant for avoiding decisions that it must make for itself. In the internal arena, the rifts among the various social segments must be healed, and the status of the IDF and the court system must be restored in the name of democracy and ethical principles. In the regional arena, it is possible and desirable to continue to promote cooperation with actors with whom Israel can work, based on overlapping interests—including local forces and influential groups that are not necessarily states—in a graduated, bottom-up manner. In the international arena, it is important to rebuild Israel’s status by relying not only on the Trump administration, but also by accentuating Israel’s added value to the free world when it comes to shared values, the economy, and scientific and technological innovation. Above all, Israel must act decisively to preserve the options for advancing arrangements with the Palestinians, based on separation, with an aim for ending the rule over the Palestinian people in a way that will ensure Israel’s continued existence as a Jewish, democratic, ethical, and secure state, for the good of both peoples.

Monday, January 9, 2017

Trump versus the Iranian nuclear deal



Cooling towers of a nuclear power plant

Donald Trump’s foreign policy platform may have been incoherent on most issues during the election campaign, but he was clear on the nuclear deal with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). According to him it was “disastrous”, “lopsided” and a “disgrace”. What he intends to do about it is not so clear. He promised to tear it up in a speech for AIPAC. However, Walid Phares, one of his foreign policy advisors, suggested he would merely try to renegotiate the terms. Alternatively, he could simply leave the deal in place, and then play hard-ball with Iran as it is implemented. Trump is already backing-off on some of his more controversial promises, so this may all be campaign fodder. However, if he does try to meddle with JCPOA, no good will come of it.

Trump’s ability to either renegotiate or annul the deal will depend on his ability to reapply sanctions and/or use military force. Political conditions are not favourable for either. One of the main motivations for negotiating the deal in the first place was the fear that counter-proliferation strikes against Iran would be destabilising in the region and could possibly escalate out of control. The situation in the Middle East is now even more fragile and unpredictable than before. The campaigns in Mosul and Raqqa are progressing, but the Syrian civil war is far from over and Daesh will likely persist as a terrorist organisation even without a territorial base. Even when the fighting is over, Iran has a vital role to play in Syria’s post-conflict political reconstruction, as it did when the Karzai government was established in Afghanistan. Washington will need to maintain a working relationship with Tehran if it has any hope of getting this situation under control. Counter-proliferation strikes would make it impossible.

Reapplying sanctions would be no less problematic. While the JCPOA was being negotiated, its critics claimed that it would be impossible to snap-back sanctions if the deal broke down after it was signed. They were wrong then, but right now. The pre-deal sanctions on Iran were powerful because of the degree to which they were multilateral. China, Russia, the EU and Japan joined the US in isolating the Islamic Republic. Economically, there was almost nowhere for Tehran to turn. If Iran had broken its promises concerning the JCPOA, then Washington would have had the moral high ground, and would have been in a fairly good position to reconstitute that coalition and put the pressure back on Iran. However, if the deal is broken unilaterally by Donald Trump, the US will look like the villain. He would have a hard time convincing allies that he dismissed as free-riders to give up lucrative new contracts with Tehran and fall back in line.

If Trump cannot convincingly threaten Iran with military force or multi-lateral sanctions, there would be little to constrain Iran’s nuclear programme if the JCPOA was torn up. Indeed, given Trump’s rhetoric, if Trump annulled the agreement, Tehran would have extra motivation to weaponise. Even if he just wanted to renegotiate, he would have very little leverage. Most worrying, he could miscalculate. If he reopened the deal and Iran did not make concessions, Trump could resort to bluster and bullying and talk himself into a situation where he had to use military force or admit defeat.

It is impossible to predict what a Trump administration would do, but the points above suggest the hard-ball option is the most likely choice. In addition to ramping up the rhetoric, Washington could look for ways outside the JCPOA framework to increase pressure. It could impose sanctions punishing Iran for its ballistic programme or its involvement in Yemen. Similarly, it could insist on the JCPOA being interpreted and implemented in strict and narrow terms. In April, for instance, Washington offered to purchase the excess heavy water Iran produced to allow Tehran to meet its obligations under the JCPOA. Instead, the Trump administration could turn any such event into an excuse to delay implementing its own obligations, such as allowing Iran access to western banks.


Ironically, limited hard-ball tactics may play well in Tehran. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei always seemed in two minds on the JCPOA. On one hand, the agreement was necessary for Iran in order to end its diplomatic and economic isolation. On the other, improving relations with the US contradicted the narrative of the revolution and threatened the regime’s identity. So far, Khamenei has tried to have it both ways. He supported the negotiating team during the talks but all the while maintained a steady barrage of anti-American rhetoric. Trump’s posturing may therefore make it easier for him to preserve the “Iran versus the Great Satan” motif in the regime’s official discourse. However, if Trump goes beyond talking tough, he could undermine the deal all together. Iran’s moderate President, Hassan Rouhani, is already under pressure from conservative opponents who, like their American counterparts, believed the JCPOA was a capitulation. He does not have the political capital to make further concessions. Moreover, if the hard-ball tactics actually began to hurt Iran’s economic recovery, Khamenei may conclude that the benefits of the JCPOA no longer outweigh the costs. If so, Trump will not have to tear up the agreement, Khamenei will do it for him.